Corporate control in Hungary. European Corporate Governance Institute; in press/forthcoming. Abstract
Corporate control in Hungary
In this paper we describe the Hungarian legal framework regulating disclosure of information about listed firms at the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE), and we analyze the concentration and types of blockholders at these firms for the years 1996-2000. Disclosure rules on the BSE became EU-compatible only very recently, and so far indirect holdings were not reported. The concentration of direct ownership is nonetheless rather high, the largest owner having 46.2 percent on average in May 2000. While this figure is similar to the corresponding levels in continental Europe, it is more unusual that the second and third largest blockholders also have large shares (on average 20.2 and 10.4 at the same date). Concentration was quite stable during 1996-1999, while it decreased somewhat in 2000. The most prevalent type of owner is foreign investor, which had over 50 percent of all blockholdings in 2000, although domestic private blockholders and the state are also present in a significant number of firms.
Ownership concentration and corporate performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do too many cooks spoil the goulash? Corporate Governance-an International Review. 2005;13(2):254-64. Abstract
Ownership concentration and corporate performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: Do too many cooks spoil the goulash?
We examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance using panel data for firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange, where ownership tends to be highly concentrated and frequently involves multiple blocks. Fixed-effects estimates imply that the size of the largest block increases profitability and efficiency strongly and monotonically, but the effects of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of the largest block, point estimates of the marginal effects of additional blocks are negative. The results suggest that the marginal costs of concentration may outweigh the benefits when the increased concentration involves "too many cooks".
Ownership concentration and corporate performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; 2003. Abstract
Ownership concentration and corporate performance on the Budapest Stock Exchange: do too many cooks spoil the goulash?
We examine the impact of ownership concentration on firm performance using panel data for firms listed on the Budapest Stock Exchange, where ownership tends to be highly concentrated and frequently involves multiple blocks. Fixed-effects estimates imply that the l largest block increases return on assets and operating efficiency strongly and monotonically, but the effects of total blockholdings are much smaller and statistically insignificant. Controlling for the size of the largest block, point estimates of the marginal effects of additional blocks are negative. The results suggest that the marginal costs of concentration may outweigh the benefits when the increased concentration involves "too many cooks."
Corporate control – A study of firms on the Bucharest Stock Exchange. Eastern European Economics. 2002;40(3):6-27. Abstract
Corporate control – A study of firms on the Bucharest Stock Exchange
This article analyzes the ownership structure of firms listed on the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) over the period 1998-2000. The history of the BSE is briefly described, showing its similarity to other post-socialist countries in terms of small size and low, liquidity of the market, and contrasting it with countries that have developed market economies. Measures of ownership concentration reveal that the BSE's concentrated ownership structure fits the pattern of continental Europe., with 70 percent of shares held by 5 percent or greater blockholders at the end of 2000. However, the major types of owners are very different from those found in industrialized countries. The Romanian government, through the State Ownership Fund, held blocks in 88 of 116 listed firms in 1998, which fell to 33 of 115 at the end of 2000, in both cases with a median share of over 50 percent. The nature of the Romanian privatization process also influenced the prevalence of other types of owners, with insiders holding blocks in 34 firms, with a 41 percent median, by the end of 2000. Foreigners held stakes in 75 firms, with a 17 percent median, while the remaining blocks were mostly in the hands of domestic firms.