Publications of Thomas Fetzer

Defending Mitbestimmung: German trade unions and European company law harmonisation 1967-1990

Recent years have witnessed an enormous growth of research about European Union legislation in the field of employee participation. Besides studies analysing the legislation itself, many publications also deal with the impact of EU developments on employee participation in member states. While impressive in its conceptual breadth and empirical detail, this literature lacks a historical dimension. Taking the example of Germany and of the German trade union confederation, DGB, this article demonstrates that such a historical perspective is important not least because it sheds new light on contemporary debates. The case study chosen concerns the impact of regulatory initiatives for a European Company (Societas Europaea, SE) Statute on DGB co-determination policy since the late 1960s. The article argues that DGB positions shifted from an exclusive focus on the protection of national achievements, towards an approach that combined protection with attempts for re-regulation at the European level from the late 1980s.

Exporting the American model? Transatlantic entanglements of industrial relations at Opel and Ford Germany (1948-1965)

Surveys of labour practices in subsidiaries of US-owned firms in Europe often argue that reluctance to join employer associations is a distinct feature of the American approach to industrial relations, entailing tensions with trade unions, particularly in so-called stakeholder economies like Germany. Taking the cases of Fordwerke and Opel, this article demonstrates, however, that this general claim does not always fit the historical pattern of US companies in post-war Germany. When the choice between plant and industry bargaining became a major issue at Opel (1948–58) and Fordwerke (1960–65), there was no significant pressure by Detroit management for decentralized negotiations. The real promoters of plant bargaining were the local works councils and union organizations, whose ideas, however, were controversial within the broader IG Metall union organization. The majority of the union's leadership feared that a decentralization of bargaining could weaken overall organizational strength and solidarity, or even lead to autoworkers splitting from the union. A transatlantic link was important, too – yet on the labour rather than on the management side: The American United Automobile Workers (UAW) trade union, concerned about growing Ford and GM investments in Western Europe, actively supported a shift towards plant bargaining in Germany through bilateral contacts and through a lobby for international collective bargaining coordination under the auspices of the International Metalworkers Federation (IMF). Such a prospect sounded as threatening to IG Metall leaders as to Ford and GM management, and their collusion accordingly ensured that industry bargaining prevailed. From the companies’ point of view the costs and constraints of membership in the German employer association were a drawback more than offset by the advantage of being shielded against a scenario of militant wage pressure by German car workers drawing on international support.

European Works Councils as Risk Communities: The Case of General Motors

The European works council (EWC) at General Motors is widely regarded as an outstanding example of cross-border trade union cooperation. This article reconstructs its development as a European trade union `risk community', which since the mid-1990s has faced unprecedented challenges to workers' interests as a result of intra-European competition for investment and GM's strategy of corporate globalization. To a limited extent, the EWC offered a European solution to local and national problems, but cross-border cooperation has remained fragile and issue-specific, and has implied a Eurocentric notion of trade union internationalism.