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Abstract:

Does the type of capitalist system affect the qualities of democratic systems? We approach this big question by narrowing down the definition of the qualities of democracies (QoD) to political equality and by operationalizing the latter in terms of equal participation of politically relevant groups in elections. The concept of market economies we narrow down to labor markets and consider the degree of regulation and protection of labor markets as the feature that interests us most. In this paper, we focus on the group of women as they present a formidable puzzle. While there can be little doubt about the fact that women are disadvantaged in the economic sphere, this form of economic and social inequality does not seem to translate into unequal political participation. Especially the literature on voter turnout provides strong and consistent evidence that gender does not matter. On average, women cast their vote as frequently as men do. The evidence is less clear when it comes to other forms of participation. In this paper, in addition to voting, we investigate whether women in different countries with different forms of democracy and different types of labor markets are more or less active than men in the following forms of participation: signing petitions, boycotting, demonstrating, contacting politicians, and using political forums on the internet. Our analysis of 24 democracies reveal that, unlike in the case of voting, there are gender-based inequalities in these forms of political participation. We attempt to explain this cross-country variation of within country differences between men and women by employing a two-step regression technique and by performing a fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).

INTRODUCTION

The underlying goal of this paper is to link two prominent strands within the comparative social science literature that, so far, are kept surprisingly apart: the study of types of market economies, on the one hand, and the different qualities of contemporary capitalist democracies, on the other. In the recent literature, several attempts have been undertaken to conceptualize and measure the qualities of democracy (QoD, (Baker & Koesel 2001; Altman & Pérez-Linán 2002; Berg-Schlosser 2004; Morlino 2004; O'Donnell et al. 2004; Diamond & Morlino 2005; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2006; Bühlmann et al. 2007). In this paper, we adopt a minimalist definition of QoD and define the principle of political equality as the core element of this concept (e.g. Beitz 1990; Dahl 2007; Rueschemeyer 2004; Verba 2003; Ware 1981). Political equality is further narrowed down to participatory equality, that is, the situation in which no social group is over- or under-represented among the politically active population.

No real existing democracy fully adheres to this standard. It is, by now, a commonly acknowledged fact that subgroups of the population that are socially disadvantaged also suffer from political disadvantages in the form of lower political participation and representation (Barnes & Kasse 1979; Verba et al. 1995; Beramendi & Anderson 2008). The poor**,** low educated, or unemployed do tend to engage less in politics. In this paper, we investigate whether the same also holds for females. Furthermore, we want to shed light on whether the degree of political inequality of women in a given democracy depends on the type of market economy.

The inspiration for our paper is based on our previous work, which demonstrated that the nature of the relationship between an individual's education and the propensity to vote varies across countries in a way that is driven to a large extent by characteristics of the economic system in which individuals act (Makszin & Schneider 2010). We find, by and large, that more labor market regulation and welfare state provisions mitigate the effect of education on the propensity to vote. Hence, in countries like the US the difference in participation between low and high educated citizens is enormous, whereas in countries such as Sweden, with its stronger regulations and welfare state provisions, this difference is much smaller and in some cases even statistically insignificant. In short, in the case of education, the

type of economic system (Esping-Andersen 1990; Iversen 2005; Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancké et al. 2007; Amable 2003) seems to matter for political equality in terms of equal participation.

Does the same hold for gender differences? There are good reasons to think that it does. In general, women are discriminated against in the economic sphere, but the economic structures in some countries are designed to counteract this discrimination more than in other countries. One should expect, then, that the degree of *political* inequality of women is lower in the group of countries with labor market regulation and welfare state provisions that aim at lowering *socio-economic* gender differences. Despite this rather plausible expectation, gender is generally been found to have little to no significant influence on propensity to vote (Burns, 2002). Most of the literature that does detects a slight gender gap offer explanations based on the lower level of resources (income, education, etc.) of women on average (Welch, 1977, Burns, Schlozman, & Verba, 2001), which would mean that in empirical studies that control for these factors, gender would likely remain insignificant. In this paper, we aim to investigate the effect of gender on political participation across countries. This paper aims to (1) identify the effect of gender on various types of political participation, (2) investigate the difference in this effect across countries, and (3) where there are differences across countries to investigate the explanatory potential of one specific macro-level factor: the type of labor market economy.

Our earlier research suggests that these cross-country patterns of participatory inequality are due to differences in the type of market economies in place. More specifically, we focus on differences in labor market structures. Labor markets are a core feature for distinguishing between different types of capitalist economies and the feature of capitalism to which individuals are most directly and most immediately exposed. The paper is structured as follows. We first outline existing micro- and macro-level theories of participation and then develop a multi-level framework that demonstrates how macro-level context and individual-level characteristics interact to influence patterns of participatory inequality. Here we outline the hypothesized effects of labor market and social policies on participatory inequality and stipulate the specific mechanisms at work on the micro-level. The third section presents the data and results of analysis by first establishing the degree of cross-country variation in the under- and over-representation of female citizens across six forms of political participation.

Using a two-stage regression model, we investigate the potential explanatory power of labor market factors for explaining cross-country variation of the degree of gender-based participatory inequalities. Section four concludes. We also run some preliminary fsQCA in order to see if a different methodological perspective on the data reveals findings that are more (or less) in line with our theoretical hunches.

I. THEORIES OF PARTICIPATORY INEQUALITY – FORMS OF CAPITALISM AND GENDER

The question why some citizens participate in politics while others do not is extensively studied in the social sciences. Particular attention is paid to the most pervasive form of political participation: voter turnout. The study of citizens' decisions whether or not to cast their votes has given rise to the sub-discipline of voting behavior. In this section, we do not even attempt at providing a comprehensive overview of this vast literature (for a comprehensive review, see Schlozman 2002), not only for space reasons, but also because we define political participation more broadly and also include other activities, such as demonstrating or writing a petition. We limit ourselves to briefly highlighting the most important macro- and micro-determinants for political participation discussed in the literature. Then we introduce types of market economies as our primary macro-level variable that might shape cross-country patterns of participatory inequalities. In a last step, we outline the broad theoretical framework of our project and explain how this paper fits into the project. This is mainly done by formulating hunches about which economic structures should increase or decrease the participatory inequalities of females.

Micro- and macro theories of turnout

Concerns about and the study of low and/or declining turnout in established Western democracies are a long running issue in political science (for a critical appraisal, see Lijphart 1997). Often times the picture painted is bleak and on a regular basis democracy is diagnosed to be in crisis because, so it appears, across the Western hemisphere, less and less citizens bother to go to vote. Low and/or declining turnout are interpreted both as a cause and consequence of democratic crises. A long list of macro-level characteristics has been

investigated as potential causes for these turnout differentials. From weekend voting to the type of electoral system and compulsory voting to more idiosyncratic features as the weather on voting day have been tested and all of these factors have been found guilty of contributing to lower overall turnout by at least some scholars.

Macro-level approaches tend to focus on a slightly different dependent variable: overall turnout differences between countries and/or elections. Franklin (2004), for instance, in his seminal work on turnout explicitly states that explaining cross-country variation in participatory inequality is not the aim of his book but acknowledges that this is a topic in dire need of investigation (Franklin 2004, p.5). The usual suspects of macro-level variables that are commonly invoked are attributes of the political system such as the electoral system features (Franklin 2004; Lijphart 1999; Iversen & Soskice 2006; Karp & Banducci 2008), compulsory voting (Anduiza Perea 2002), or macroeconomic conditions (Radcliff 1992). Few, if any, of these macro-level approaches explicitly aim at explaining why in some countries socially disadvantaged are almost indistinguishable from the average citizen in terms of participation patterns while in others they are clearly politically unequal. One of these few is the claim that the degree of trade union density and the strength of the left party explain both higher turnout and higher participation of at least that part of the socially underprivileged that is unionized (Pontusson & Rueda 2010). This approach, like most other macro-approaches, does focus, however, on voter turnout and less on other forms of political participation.

These macro-level explanations abound, but are only of limited use for the purpose of explaining *cross-country* variation of *within-country* inequality patterns. Macro-level determinants of turnout are pretty weak in capturing the within-country variation. The claim that, say, weekend voting can explain why turnout is lower than in countries without weekend voting rests on the assumption that this (and any other potential macro-level) determinant of voter turnout has the same effect on all citizens. We deem it more plausible to start from the assumption that macro-level factors affect individuals differently. For instance, weekend voting affects people with different lifestyles differently; elderly or unemployed find it easier to vote on a weekday than full-time employed people do.

The task of explaining within-country turnout differentials is usually tackled by employing individual level characteristics. Here, the literature has consistently shown that socially under-privileged are less likely to participate in elections, though the relative importance of income,

education, or other dimensions of 'life chances' varies (Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980; Verba et al. 1995; Gallego 2007b). Several causal mechanisms are offered as explanations why people with low income, low education, and/or in unstable job situations vote less (see e.g Anderson & Beramendi 2005). In these studies of voter turnout, gender is usually found to be insignificant.

Macro-level variables have an influence on overall turnout differentials between countries while micro-level characteristics can explain within-country variation in participation. Since in this paper we are interested in explaining cross-country variation of within-country gender-related political inequality patterns, we need to interact macro-level and micro-level determinants of voter participation. Such interactions have been attempted (Anduiza Perea 2002; Gallego 2007a; Gallego 2007b; Gallego 2008). They still remain surprisingly rare, especially those that focus on gender as an individual characteristic that might have different consequences in different economic contexts. In our approach, we also investigate how the propensity to participate (or abstain) in politics varies for females in different market economies. In order to investigate the existing cross-country variation among patterns of within-country political inequality, we can neither rely only on the micro-level mechanisms driving participation differentials between social groups, nor solely apply the macro-level explanations of overall turnout rate differentials between countries. Instead, we need to combine these two strands of the literature in a two-level model.

In this paper, we investigate whether the type of economic system has a systematic effect on the participation of women in politics. Our hunch is that more strongly regulated and protected labor markets do increase female political participation. This expectation rests on the plausible assumption that women more than men depend on such regulations and that these regulations are subject to political decisions to either reduce, extend, or maintain them. Hence, if life chances of women in general depend more on the degree of labor market regulations, then there is more at stake for women than for men when such regulations become the object of political debate and women in such countries have greater incentives to engage in politics than women in democracies with non-regulated labor market economies.

As mentioned above, we deem it important to broaden the view on political participation. By definition, citizens in democracies are entitled to participate in the process of collectively binding decision-making also by other means than just casting their vote at regular

intervals. They can contact their representative in parliament, go to demonstrations, sign a petition, etc. The inclusion of these other forms of political participation in our study is warranted not only because it provides a more complete picture of participatory patterns, but also because existing research shows that when it comes to voting, the participation rate of women is statistically indistinguishable from that of men in almost all countries and elections. In order to find out whether this participatory equality is a general phenomenon or only holds true for voting (which is a very peculiar type of participation because unlike with other forms, still the majority of citizens in most democracies does participate), we need to subject other participatory forms to empirical investigation.

Mechanisms linking the politico-economic structure to individual propensities to participate in politics

In this section, we spell out our hypotheses on how the politico-economic structure, on the one hand, and individual characteristics, on the other, jointly exert an effect on the propensity of females to participate in politics. Our focus on the type of market economy (see conceptualization below) as a crucial factor for understanding participatory inequalities is innovative as this important characteristic of a country has so-far been surprisingly neglected in the literature.

The background theory for our expectation that the politico-economic context matters for participatory inequalities is the well-known and influential model of political participation developed by Verba et al. (1995). It is widely accepted as a plausible account explaining the very consistent empirical finding that socially underprivileged participate less in democratic politics. We, however, extend their model for predicting individual participation and stipulate that the core individual-level factors for political participation – resources, stakes, and mobilization (RSM) – are crucially shaped by the economic and political context in which individuals act. Hence, RSM not only vary between different groups within one country, but also across different countries for the same social group.

From this model, we derive the expectation that economic and political macro-level context shapes the micro-level distribution of RSM and, thus, the participation rates of social groups. More specifically, the more comprehensive the labor market institutions and the higher the political competition among parties on the related policies, the higher will be the

degree of political equality of the socially underprivileged because this politico-economic macro-level context provides for a more equal distribution of resources, stakes, and mobilization among social groups.

What is the causal mechanism that links differences in labor market regulations and social policies to differences in RSM of socially disadvantaged? The answer to this question rests, as mentioned, in their interplay with the political context, here understood in terms of party competition on labor market and social policies.[1] Figure 1 summarizes the argument on the interaction effects between these two macro-level characteristics (labor market regulations or social policies and political competition) on the distribution of individual-level RSM of socially disadvantaged citizens, a group that arguably includes females. For presentational purposes, we currently classify countries as having high or low political competition on labor market and social policies. Furthermore, we distinguish countries as to whether their labor market institutions are characterized by high or low coordination and protection. In the project, we will develop more nuanced scalar measures for both of these dimensions, but for now the dichotomous conception yields four different economic-political contexts in which socially underprivileged citizens act. For each of the four cells in the 2x2 matrix, we indicate the degree of resources, stakes, and mobilization, respectively, of socially disadvantaged citizens.

Figure 1: Resources, stakes, and mobilization for political participation of socially disadvantaged citizens in different market economy democracies

			Political competition on labor market institutions' coordination and protection	
			low	***high***
Labour market institutions' coordination and protection	***high***	*resources*	+	+
		stakes	(IV)	(I)
		mobilization	-	+ ***low political***
			0	+ ***inequality***
	low	*resources*	-	-
		stakes	(III)	(II)
		mobilization	- ***high political***	+
			- ***inequality***	0

+, -, and 0 indicate high, low, and medium degree of equality of resources, stakes, and mobilization for the underprivileged, respectively.

Our model rests on three separate causal mechanisms. They jointly determine the degree of equal political participation. First, we claim that the resources (time, money, cognitive

[1] Below we provide a more detailed description of how we operationalize different types of labor market economies.

skills) of socially disadvantaged are determined by the degree to which labor market institutions are coordinated and employees are protected. A highly regulated labor market with generous social policies tends to produces more resource equality, whereas a less regulated and less generous regime results in less resources for the socially disadvantaged. Applied to female citizens, this means that in labor market economies with many regulations tailored to promote their needs, they maintain more resources than in economies based on rules that neglect the gender dimension.

Stakes, in turn, depend on the political competition on welfare state issues: more competition leads to higher stakes for socially disadvantaged, whereas the lack of competition on welfare state and labor market issues lowers these stakes. We claim that underprivileged citizens will perceive higher stakes, thereby increasing their incentive to participate in politics, when there is a debate between political actors about policies that matter for them. With regard to female citizens, this implies that their political participation is expected to be higher in democracies where political organizations argue about rules and regulations aiming at improving their life chances.

Finally, the degree of mobilization is determined by the interaction between the economic and political structure. When there is political competition on labor market and social policies, political actors have an increased incentive to mobilize socially disadvantaged groups to participate. In the presence of more regulated labor markets and generous social policies (cell I in Figure 1), it is easier to achieve this mobilization for two reasons. First, the very fact that generous welfare state provisions are in place suggests the presence of at least one strong collective actor that acts on behalf of the underprivileged and tends to mobilize them, such as strong left wing parties or trade unions.[2] Second, mobilization of the underprivileged by actors that propose policies to their benefit is easier if the socially underprivileged have more resources, which they do in effective labor market welfare state regimes. In cases where political competition on labor market and welfare state regime issues is low, socially underprivileged are still more easily mobilized, but political actors have less incentive to engage in (costly) political mobilization of the underprivileged. This results in low

[2] Although this is related to the power resources argument in the welfare state literature (Korpi 1985), we do not need to assume that these collective actors are the *primary* determinant of welfare state outcomes. We simply assume that at least one actor acts on behalf of the socially underprivileged, which holds true for all countries with highly regulated or protective labour market insitutions.

levels of mobilization in countries with low levels of welfare state (cell III in Figure 1) and medium levels of mobilization in cases with an effective welfare state (cell II) because here, even if incentives are low, mobilization costs are lower due to the higher resource level of the poor and the strength of collective actors that are often in place in more effective welfare states. We deem it reasonable to claim that all these arguments also apply to the specific group of female citizens.

Jointly, these three mechanisms for the distribution of resources, stakes, and mobilization yield a model that predicts three different levels of participatory inequality of the socially disadvantaged, in general, and female citizens, in particular. Participatory inequality is: high when both the labor market institutions' level of regulation and protection and political competition is low (cell III); medium when the economic and political context point in opposite directions (cells II, IV); and low when both labor market institution regulation and protection and political competition are high (cell I).

Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of the model applied in our paper. It also shows how our approach relates to other takes on political participation and visualizes the multi-level character of our model. Five broad concepts (large boxes) are involved. As outlined above, different strands of the literature investigate causal links between some of these boxes (thin arrows). Our project is innovative in several respects. First, we specify each of the broad concepts by narrowing down its meaning, thus making it measurable in larger *n* comparisons (small boxes shaded in yellow). Second, we combine these different approaches by integrating them into a multi-level model and subjecting their claims to an empirical test (thick arrows).

Figure 2: The multi-level nature of our model and its relation to existing approaches



Third, our multi-level model and its reliance on clearly identified multiple mechanisms provides multiple opportunities for being wrong, a characteristic of a good theory (King et al. 1994; Platt 1964). Most obviously, we would have to concede defeat if at the macro level there is no association between the type of politico-economic context, on the one hand, and the degree of participatory inequality of the socially underprivileged, on the other. In addition to this, if there was such an association at the macro level, our theory would not be convincing if it was not based on the micro-level mechanisms specified in our theory. In other words, even if a country's economic-political context co-varies with its degree of political equality, this might well be the result of a process that is unrelated to the distribution of RSM among the group of socially underprivileged.

II. Empirical Results: Female Political Participation in Different politico-Economic Contexts

The aim of this section is to present empirical findings about the effect of gender on the propensity to participate in politics and perform an initial investigation of the utility of labor

market characteristics for explaining cross-country differences in gender-based patterns of participatory inequality.[3] In order to investigate the effect of gender on different forms of political participation, we run logistic regressions with each form of participation as the dependent variable and test the effect of gender while controlling for other individual level characteristics that are known determinants of political participation (education, age, and income). We run separate logistic regressions for each country for six types of political participation (voting, demonstrating, signing a petition, boycotting, contacting a politician, and participating in political forums on the internet). Using the results of these analyses, we are able to calculate differences in the predicted probabilities of participation between men and women (controlling for other characteristics) and to determine the countries and the forms of participation where the effect of gender is statistically significant. Finally, we will use the two-step hierarchical regression technique (Achen 2005; Duch & Stevenson 2005; Huber et al. 2005) to test the possible macro-level factors that may explain the cross-country variation in the effect of gender on propensity to participate.

Data[4]

The individual-level data is from the Citizenship wave of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) from 2004, which has data available on multiple types of participation from both European and non-European countries. Our analysis includes all available countries in the ISSP dataset that (1) have information about political participation and (2) are uncontested democracies and capitalist economic systems for at least 15 years[5]. For the second stage of the two-step regression analysis and the fsQCA, the data on labor market was collected for the year 2002 and is compiled from OECD, ILO, and ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts, as outlined in the appendix.

[3] Empirical investigation of the interaction with political competition (outlined in the framework above) is left to our future research.

[4] The authors would like to thank Daniela Sirinic for her excellent research assistance.

[5] The countries included in the analysis are: Australia (AU), Austria (AT), Canada (CA), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany – separated into East and West (DE-E, DE-W), Great Britain (GB), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Japan (JP), Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), New Zealand (NZ), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Sweden (SE), Slovenia (SI), Slovakia (SK), Spain (ES), Switzerland (CH), and United States (US).

Does gender have an effect on propensity to participate?

For each of our countries and each form of political participation, we establish whether men and women are different when it comes to political participation, when controlling for age, income, and education. To begin our analysis, we run logistic regressions for each country where individual citizens are the unit of analysis. For each regression, one of the six types of participation is the dependent variable and we estimate the following logistic regression model:

$$log\left(\frac{\text{Probability of participation}}{\text{Probability of non-participation}}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 * female + \beta_2 * age + \beta_3 * education + \beta_4 * income$$

From the many logistic regressions (24 cases and 6 types of participation), we present a summary of the findings in this section. For the purposes of our current analysis, we focus exclusively on the effects on gender and treat the remaining variables exclusively as control variables.

Based upon the results from the logistic regression, we calculate predicted probabilities in order to show how the effect of gender varies across countries and forms of participation. Figure 3 shows the *difference* between the predicted probability of voting for a female citizen compared to a male citizen (with all other variables held at their mean values) for each country with 95% confidence intervals around the average difference.[6] A value of zero indicates that there is no difference between the probability of voting of men or women. A positive (negative) value shows that women are more (less) likely to vote than men. The effect is only considered significant when the confidence interval does not contain zero. For example, the value for the United States (on the far right) is 0.07, which implies that women are 7% more likely to vote than men. Since the confidence interval does not contain zero, we conclude that the positive difference is statistically significant. All countries with statistically significant differences are indicated with an asterisk (*) in the figures.

[6] The differences in predicted probabilities and confidence intervals were calculated using the CLARIFY program in STATA (King et al. 2000).

Figure 3: First differences in predicted probability of voting for female compared to male citizens



Figure 3 supports previous findings in the literature that gender does not have a significant effect on propensity to vote. Almost all the differences in the predicted probabilities are not statistically significant as zero is contained in the confidence intervals. The few exceptions (Finland, United States) actually show that women are *over*-represented in the voting population. So there is no evidence of under-representation of women in the propensity to vote for any of the countries included in the analysis.

One reason why apparently there is no gender bias in voter turnout might be the fact that vote is the political activity in which by far more citizens participate than in any other. At higher participation rates the likelihood for participatory inequalities diminishes. It therefore makes sense to also examine other, less frequent but equally important, forms of participation and to see if female citizens are also not under-represented in those forms of participation.

Figure 4 shows the differences in predicted probabilities of contacting a politician. These probabilities are also calculated holding age, education, and income level constant (at their

means) and comparing a female citizen with the equivalent male citizen. Again, the figure displays the predicted difference between women and men and the 95% confidence interval around this point estimate.

Figure 4: First differences in predicted probability of contacting a politician for female compared to male citizens



This figure shows that in 15 out of our 24 cases, female citizens have a significantly lower probability of contacting a politician when compared to an equivalent male citizen. Additionally, there are no countries where women are over-represented among citizens who contact politicians. So the effect of being a female is either negative or not statistically significant. Unlike voting, not only do we detect the under-representation of females in contacting politicians, but we also find large variation across countries in the degree of under-representation. For example, in Switzerland women are 16.7% less likely to contact a politician than men. Other countries where women are clearly under-represented in this form of political participation are Austria (by 12.5%), Slovakia (by 11.1%), Ireland (by 11.0%), Germany (West by 9.8%, East by 7.3%), Slovenia (by 7.7%), among others. These differences in predicted probabilities might not seem high. Consider, though, that these are the differences between men and women net of several other plausible reasons for why citizens

might not contact politicians (age, education, income). In the light of this and the fact that for vote no such difference could be detected, these findings are notable. This holds true, even though in some countries, no statistically significant difference between male and female probabilities of contacting a politician can be detected (Canada, Hungary, Latvia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Australia, and the United States). As a matter of fact, based on our theoretical model, we do expect variation of female political inequality across countries.

In order to more thoroughly explore the cross-country variation in multiple forms of participation, Table 1 summarizes the findings related to the first differences between the predicted probabilities of participation for a female citizen compared to a male citizen (calculated based on the logistic regressions as described above) for all six forms of participation. Here we indicate the significance and direction of the difference between female and male citizens. The blank cells indicate the specific countries and forms of participation where the gender differences were *not* statistically significant. A minus sign (-) indicates that female citizens participated significantly less than male citizens, indicating that women are under-represented, and a plus sign (+) where women participated significantly more than men and women, thus, are over-represented.

Table 1: Gender-based inequality in different forms of political participation[7]

	Vote	Petition	Boycott	Demonstrate	Contact politician	Internet	Sum (without vote)
PL		-		-	-	-	-4
CH					-	-	-2
SI					-	-	-2
PT					-	-	-2
GB				-		-	-2
DK					-		-1
SK					-		-1
CZ					-		-1
ES						-	-1
HU			-				-1
FR		+		-	-	-	-2
DE-W			+	-	-		-1
IE		+		-	-		-1
NL			+		-	-	-2
AT		+	+	-	-	-	-1
AU			+			-	0
NO			+			-	0
DE-E		+			-		0
JP		+	+	-	-		0
FI	+	+	+		-	-	0
CA		+					1
US	+	+					1
NZ		+	+				2
SE		+	+				2

blank = no statistically significant difference in participation between male and female citizens
Negative values = female participation is significantly lower than male participation
Positive values = female participation is significantly higher than male participation

The overview in Table 1 reveals several interesting findings. Comparing the different forms of participation, we see the following. First, in line with the mainstream literature we find that participation in elections is the most gender neutral political activity. In only two countries can we detect a statistically significant difference between men and women (United States and Finland) and in both countries it is women that turn out *more* than men. Second, the

[7] The sample size for the logistic regressions varied from country to country between 370 (Germany, East) and 1615

remaining participatory acts can be divided into two groups: on the one hand, petitions and boycott show mostly an over-representation of women; on the other hand, demonstrating, contacting a politician, and using political forums on the internet are, if anything, forms of political participation dominated by males. The fact that this pattern holds across such a diverse set of countries is quite striking. Further research would be needed in order to find the reasons why there are male vs. female dominated forms of participation.

Shifting the perspective to a comparison between countries, we see rather significant variation in the patterns of under- and over-representation across countries. This gives rise to three broad clusters of countries. In the first group, women are under-represented in at least one, but often more, form of political participation and are not over-represented in any forms of participation. This includes the first ten countries listed in Table 1.[8] Poland is leading this group with a statistically significant under-representation of women in all but one form of political participation (excluding vote). The second group consists of a set of ten cases[9] in which the gender-related difference in political participation is positive for some forms of participation (petitioning and/or boycotting) and negative for other forms (demonstrating, contacting a politician, and/or using political forums on the internet). The third group consists of four countries (Canada, United States, New Zealand, and Sweden) that show an over-representation of female citizens in at least one of the two aforementioned activities of petitioning and boycotting and do not exhibit under-representation in any of the other forms of participation. This cross-country variation suggests that macro-level characteristics do play a role in shaping gender-related participatory inequalities, which we will analyze further in the next section.

The results presented in this section show that there are some countries where gender is a significant factor for determining the likelihood of political participation. Our aim was to investigate how gender may matter, but we can by no means conclude that gender is more significant than other factors (such as education, age, or income) based on this analysis. Rather, we find that even when controlling for these other factors, gender still matters in some cases. Most importantly for our project, we detect cross-country variation in the effects

(Australia). All significance levels refer to a 95% confidence level.

[8] Specifically, the countries are Czech Republic, Denmark, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Switzerland.

of gender. In other words, the political equality of women varies across democracies. In the next section, we proceed to test whether labor market differences can explain this variation.

Two-step regression

In our previous research (Makszin & Schneider 2010), we find that labor market characteristics have significant explanatory power for understanding the *cross-country differences* in the effect of education on participation. The political disadvantage of lower educated citizens is less pronounced in those democracies that operate in more regulated and generous labor market economies. In this paper, we test if the same is true for gender. Is the political participation rate of women affected by the type of market economy?

A two-step regression is argued to be the most appropriate method for understanding cross-country differences in effects of a variable (Achen 2005; Duch & Stevenson 2005; Huber et al. 2005). When micro-macro level interactions are included in multi-level models that simultaneously estimate the parameters of each level, it is assumed that the included macro-level variables explain all variation in at that level, only allowing for residuals at the micro-level (Lewis & Linzer 2005). In order to avoid such a strong assumption we opt for a two step regression. In our case, the first stage regressions are the individual level logistic regressions presented above, which we perform separately for each country with each form of participation as the dependent variable and gender, education, age, and income as the independent variables. In the second stage, countries are our unit of analysis and we run ordinary least squares regressions. The dependent variable is the estimated *difference between the predicted probability of participation of men and women*, which is calculated from the first stage regression and presented in Figures 3 and 4. A higher value on the dependent variable implies that the predicted probability for a female citizen to participation was higher relative to the predicted probability for a male citizen. As independent variables, we specify various characteristics of the labor market that are related to the situation of women: female unemployment rate, female employment rate, employment protection legislation, social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, union density rate, and degree of wage coordination (OECD 2008; ILO; Visser 2009; more details about this data is included in the appendix).

[9] These countries are Australia, Austria, Finland, France, Germany (East and West), Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands,

When analyzing voting, we also control for the type of electoral system (proportional or majoritarian) and the presence of compulsory voting.

As presented in the previous section, overall we find some variation in the effect of gender on participation, given that in some countries the gender differences were statistically significant. The variance in the effects of gender are particularly low for voting (implying low variance on the dependent variable), but higher for the other forms of participation. We ran regressions for each form of participation and six different combination of labor market variables (shown in the table below). Given the low number of observations (n=24), we include only three variable at a time and include variables that capture different aspects of the labor market. We include either female unemployment or female employment rate, but never both. Then we test the effect of one of the following: employment protection legislation, union density rate, or index of wage coordination. We included social spending in each model.

In general, our findings from the thirty-six regression models is that most of the labor market characteristics were not shown to be statistically significant for explaining the gender differences in predicted probabilities in each of the six forms of participation. To save on space, we present here only the findings for the six models with gender difference in probability of contacting a politician as the dependent variable. The two step regression findings for this form of participation closely resemble those for other forms of participation. Important differences between the forms of participation will be noted below. Table 2 presents the coefficients and standard errors for each of the six models. A positive (negative) coefficient implies that female probability of participation is higher (lower) relative to male probability of participation.

and Norway.

Table 2: Results of OLS regressions for gender differences in predicted probability of contacting a politician

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Female unemployment rate	-.0342		-.0341		-.1035	
	(.2089)		(.2086)		(.1596)	
Female employment rate		.05179		.05717		.0308
		(.1620)		(.1783)		(.1227)
Employment protection legislation	-.1009	-.0352				
	(1.279)	(1.296)				
Social expenditure as a percentage of GDP	-.2485	-.2491	-.2666	-.2471	-.0664	-.0684
	(.2633)	(.2621)	(.2445)	(.2533)	(.1840)	(.1859)
Union density rate			.0043	-.0028		
			(.0516)	(.0576)		
Index of wage coordination (higher value indicates more coordination)					-2.261*	-2.207*
					(.6198)	(.6221)

n=24, * statistically significant at the 0.01 level

As seen in Table 2, most of the labor market factors do not have significant explanatory power for understanding the cross-country differences in the effect of gender on participation. The only statistically significant variable is the level of wage coordination. The direction of its effect is opposite to our expectation, though. According to our findings, higher degrees of wage coordination are associated with a lower (i.e. more negative) difference between the predicted probabilities, implying that women have a lower probability of contacting a politician when compared to men. The direction of this effect is the inverse of the hypothesized effect (that higher labor market regulation and coordination lead to higher participation of women relative to men). Why do we find this relationship? High wage coordination may be associated with a greater gap between labor market "insiders and outsiders", which can often place women in a more precarious situation in the labor market (i.e. women are more likely to be outsiders). However, since wage coordination did not have

significant explanatory power for any other form of participation, this interpretation is not robust enough to form a strong conclusion.

In the regressions for other forms of participation (results are available upon request), similarly the effects of most of the labor market factors are insignificant. The few exceptions where labor market factors seems to have a significant effect include higher union density was associated with a lower gender gap for probability of participating in political forums on the internet and for probability of demonstrating (in Model 3). The characteristic of the labor market that appeared to affect gender differences in participation varied across types of participation and appeared sensitive to the other independent variables included in the model. This suggests that the findings where labor market factors did matter were not highly robust.

The general conclusions from our statistical analyses are, therefore, that features of the labor market do not robustly explain the differences in the effect of gender on participation. There are several possible reasons that labor market variables may be largely insignificant, which should be investigated with further research. From a theoretical perspective, it might simply be that our theory is inaccurate and labor market factors do not shape gender-based participatory inequalities. This, in itself, would be interesting because for other individual characteristics, such as education, the type of labor does matter for the propensity to participate in politics. But the reason for our non-finding could also be a methodological artifact. First, the variance on the dependent variable in the second stage (the effect of gender of participation) is quite low, making it highly unlikely that any macro-level independent variable will be significant in the second stage. Second, perhaps the labor market indicators used in this analysis do not adequately capture the *gender relevant* differences across labor markets. We used standard measures of labor market characteristics, but perhaps more specific indicators should be used that can capture how employment protection legislation and social policies affect women more specifically. Third, the number of cases is so low that the powers of sophisticated statistical techniques cannot be fully applied. Fourth, perhaps the relation between labor market features and female political participation is not one of correlation but, rather of set relation. If so, statistical methods are not the most appropriate approach, at least not those that are based on symmetric measures of associations, such as the logistic regressions used here.

Fuzzy-Set QCA

One way of addressing some of the methodological concerns just raised is to apply fuzzy-set QCA (Ragin 1987; Ragin 2000; Ragin 2008; Schneider & Wagemann, forthcoming). Rather than variables, it uses (fuzzy) set membership scores of cases in sets of conditions and the outcome as the evidence to be analyzed. It is also less inhibited by low numbers of cases. Most importantly, it checks the data for asymmetric set relations that can be interpreted in terms of necessity and sufficiency. This, in turn, allows for solution formulas that display equifinal and conjunctural patterns. In other words, with fsQCA, we ask the question which configurations (plural) of conditions might be sufficient (or necessary) for political under-representation of women.

Due to time and space restrictions, we only analyze one form of political participation: contacting a politician. The outcome to be explained is the membership of cases in the set of high under-representation of women in contacting politicians (Y). The conditions are high female unemployment rate (A), high social expenditure (B), and a high employment protection system. Table 3 summarizes the raw data, the qualitative anchors used for calibrating the sets, and the set membership scores that result from this calibration procedure.

Table 3: Raw data, qualitative anchors and fuzzy set membership scores of cases in the conditions and the outcome.

	raw data				fuzzy sets			
Country	Difference in predicted probability of contacting a politician	Female unemp rate	Social expenditure	Employ-ment protection legislation	Y	A	B	C
AT	-0.12548	3.892018	27.254	2.126	0,98	0,04	0,98	0,59
AU	0.014287	6.155001	16.997	1.19	0,01	0,3	0,02	0,08
CA	-0.03024	7.131314	17.106	0.75	0,5	0,51	0,02	0,02
CH	-0.16731	3.101992	19.139	1.14	1,0	0,02	0,13	0,07
CZ	-0.04748	9.035138	20.585	1.919	0,68	0,68	0,4	0,44
DE-E	-0.07334	8.346091	27.386	2.321	0,86	0,62	0,98	0,72
DE-W	-0.09793	8.346091	27.386	2.321	0,95	0,62	0,98	0,72
DK	-0.05748	4.968825	26.625	1.5	0,76	0,12	0,97	0,18
ES	-0.03261	16.35664	20.399	2.977	0,53	0,97	0,35	0,95
FI	-0.06422	9.069212	25.011	2.055	0,81	0,68	0,92	0,54
FR	-0.05958	10.10619	28.381	3.015	0,78	0,76	0,99	0,95
GB	-0.0025	4.382351	19.365	0.676	0,06	0,07	0,16	0,02
HU	-0.01366	5.422562	21.501	1.345	0,16	0,17	0,57	0,12
IE	-0.11056	4.048425	15.18	0.984	0,97	0,05	0,0	0,05
JP	-0.03733	5.085986	17.815	1.487	0,58	0,13	0,04	0,18
NL	-0.06779	3.481625	20.481	2.303	0,83	0,03	0,37	0,71
NO	-0.04297	3.670546	23.683	2.612	0,64	0,03	0,83	0,86
NZ	-0.00291	5.471125	18.546	1.226	0,06	0,18	0,08	0,09
PL	-0.05303	20.8997	22.53	1.5	0,73	0,99	0,71	0,18
PT	-0.04189	6.044045	20.549	3.628	0,62	0,28	0,39	0,99
SE	-0.03864	4.742173	29.35	2.263	0,59	0,09	0,99	0,69
SI	-0.07682	6.803682	23.076	0	0,88	0,45	0,78	0,0
SK	-0.11132	18.69973	17.689	1.662	0,97	0,99	0,04	0,27
US	0.018768	5.614191	15.862	0.21	0,01	0,2	0,01	0,0

Set of countries with high …		*Qualitative anchors (for 1, 0.5, 0, respectively)*
Y	female under-representation in contacting politicians	-10, -3, 0
A	female unemployment	15, 7, 4
B	social expenditure	26, 21, 18
C	employment protection	3, 2, 1

At the core of any QCA is the truth table representation of the empirical evidence at hand. As Table 4 shows, the 24 cases distribute among all 8 logically possible combinations of

conditions. This creates the rather uncommon situation of a truth table without logical remainders.

None of the conditions or their logical complements come even close to be necessary for the outcome. If we impose a consistency threshold for rows to be included into the logical minimization of 0.85, 6 out of the 8 rows are interpreted as constituting sufficient conditions for the outcome 'high female under-representation in among citizens that contact politicians'.

Table 4: Truth table

Row	A	B	C	Y	#cases	consistency
1	1	1	1	1	4	0.99
2	1	1	0	1	1	0.99
3	0	0	1	1	2	0.96
4	0	1	1	1	3	0.94
5	1	0	1	1	1	0.92
6	0	1	0	1	3	0.88
7	1	0	0	0	3	0.83
8	0	0	0	0	7	0.56

The logical minimization of the information contained in Table 4 yields the following solution term. Two sufficient paths towards the outcome are identified. Either high social expenditure or high employment protection or both are leading to high levels of under-representation of females among those citizens that contact to their politicians. As indicated by their raw coverage, each path captures more than 50% of the fuzzy set membership scores in outcome Y. However, the low values for unique coverage, especially for condition C, indicates that both paths overlap to a significant degree. In other words, most cases that display high employment protection also do show high social expenditure (but the inverse is not true, as the higher unique coverage value for B shows and as cases like Slovenia, and especially Denmark with its flexicurity system demonstrate).

Figure 5: Sufficient conditions for ‚high under-representation of females'

	raw coverage	unique coverage	consistency
B	0.66	0.21	0.85
C	0.54	0.08	0.85

solution coverage: 0.74
solution consistency: 0.8

One particularly useful way of displaying the results in fsQCA is via a so-called xy plot. Figure 6 charts each case's membership score in the solution term against its membership score in the outcome. In general, the closer cases are to the main diagonal, the more the condition can be considered as being an empirically relevant sufficient condition. Cases below the main diagonal contradict the statement of sufficiency and thus lower the consistency of this condition. Cases above the main diagonal, in turn, are not well explained and thus lower the coverage of the condition. Overall, the consistency is high enough (0.85). In addition, there is only one true logical contradiction, that is, cases that are more in than out of the set of the condition while being more out than in the set of the outcome. Hungary fulfils this criterion, whereas all other cases below the main diagonal are all more in than out of the sets of both the condition and the outcome.

Cases such as Austria, Slovenia, Germany, Finland, Denmark, and France are well covered, or explained, by the condition high social security spending. They have high membership both in the set of female under-representation and high social spending. Switzerland, Slovakia, and Ireland, in turn, are not well explained by this condition: they have very low membership in the set of countries with high social spending. Yet, female citizens are politically under-represented. Cases in the lower left corner are of little relevance as they exhibit low membership scores both in the sufficient condition and the outcome and thus provide only weak evidence against or in favor of the statement of sufficiency.

Figure 6: XY Plot of sufficient condition B for high female under-representation in contacting politicians



How do these results relate to our theoretical expectations? It is probably not much of an exaggeration to claim that they are in stark contrast to what we expected. According to our model, *more* social spending and *more* regulation should provide female citizens with *more* resources, stakes, and motivation to engage in politics. The results point into the opposite direction. Cases with high social spending and/or high regulations also display high female under-representation among politically active citizens (at least with regard to contacting politicians).

We abstain from over-interpreting these findings. Obviously, more effort needs to be put in performing a more thorough fsQCA. This will involve better justification for the set calibration and the selection of conditions. For the time being, though, the interpretation of

the fsQCA results is in line with those from the two step regression analysis: both cast doubt that the claim that the labor market type matters for female political equality.[10]

III. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we find that there is a significant effect of gender on propensity to participate for many non-electoral forms of participation. The prevailing wisdom in the participation literature, i.e. that female citizens are as active as male citizens, seems to be wrong. It therefore is inaccurate to assume that there is not a gender bias in political participation just because one focuses on voting behavior alone. Second, we find groups of countries that are characterized by under-representation of women across multiple forms of participation. This does suggest that the macro-level context in which citizens make their decisions about political participation does matter. Our hypothesis that labor market factors may explain these cross-country differences was tested and the findings were inconclusive. There are some patterns in the two-step regression and QCA analysis that suggest that labor market factors may matter – but they do so in a way not anticipated by our theoretical model. Further research is needed to disentangle these relationships.

In future research, labor market indicators should be adapted to more specifically reflect the situation of women in the labor market. For example, cross-nationally comparable data on gender wage gap, social protection through programs more specifically affecting women's situation in the labor market, or employment protection legislation for part-time employment could more closely match the concepts in our theoretical framework.

Also additional analyses should be performed as to whether the causal mechanisms are, indeed, in place as stipulated by our theoretical model. More specifically, we will need to empirically investigate whether, on average, women in regulated labor market economies dispose of more resources (time, money, cognitive skills) than in less regulated; whether their (perceived) stakes are higher in democracies where parties fight over such regulations; and whether they are better mobilized. This approach to more specifically test the mechanisms in

[10] This conclusion is fostered by the results of fsQCA when we analyze the set of not highly under-represented women as an outcome, i.e. the logical opposite of thje outcome used in the analysis above. None of the 8 logically possible combinations of our three conditions passes a threshold of consistency of higher than 0.8. And none of the single conditions can be considered as being necessary. All this indicates that the three conditions tested here are close to irrelevant for understanding why in some countries female citizens are not highly under-represented.

our theoretical model will help to more clearly identify whether and how labor market factors matter.

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Appendix 1: Sources of Labor Market Data

The sources of the macro level data used to measure labor market types are summarized in Table 5.

Table 5: Labor market variables used in analysis

Variable	Source	Website
Female unemployment rate	ILO, 2002	www.ilo.org/kilm
Female to male unemployment ratio	ILO, 2002	www.ilo.org/kilm
Male employment rate	ILO, 2002	www.ilo.org/kilm
Female employment rate	ILO, 2002	www.ilo.org/kilm
Female to male employment ratio	ILO, 2002	www.ilo.org/kilm
Social expenditure as a percentage of GDP	OECD, 2002	
Wage coordination index	Visser, Average 1995-2004	http://www.uva-aias.net/207
Degree of government intervention in wage coordination index	Visser, Average 1995-2004	http://www.uva-aias.net/208
Employment protection legislation index	OECD, 2002	http://www.oecd.org/document/11/0,3746,en_2649_33927_42695243_1_1_1_1,00.html
Union density rate	Visser, Average 1995-2004	http://www.uva-aias.net/209
Unemployment benefit replacement rate	OECD, 2004	http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3343,en_2649_34637_39617987_1_1_1_1,00.html#statistics
Unemployment benefit duration of benefits (in months)	OECD, 2004	Same as above

Appendix 2: Figures showing first differences in predicted probability for female compared to male citizens

Demonstrating



Use of political internet forums



Signing a petition



Boycotting



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