
Frontiers of Democracy

The Challenge of Embedding Democratic Values in Central and Eastern Europe

Two steps forward, one step back

Adam Reichardt



Center for European Neighborhood Studies

The Center for European Neighborhood Studies (CENS) is an independent research center of the Central European University (CEU) located in Budapest, Hungary. Its main goal is to contribute to an informed international dialogue about the future of the European Union in the world, while capitalizing on its Central European perspective and regional embeddedness.

The strategic focus of the center is academic and policy-oriented research on the place and role of the European Union in its rapidly changing and increasingly volatile neighborhood. Through its research, CENS seeks to contribute to the understanding of the environment where the EU, its member states and partners need to (co)operate, and it aims at supporting the constructive development of these relations by providing opportunities for discussion and exchange. The center's geographic focus areas are Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Turkey, Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Russia.

Frontiers of Democracy Embedding Democratic Values in Moldova and Ukraine

Moldova and Ukraine, countries of the European Union's Eastern Partnership program, are undergoing complex processes of democratic transformation, but with weak embeddedness of democratic values and principles drawbacks can occur. It is embeddedness that helps to overcome the challenges of transformation and pushes countries beyond mere frontiers of democracy towards becoming strongly committed democratic communities. The goal of the "Frontiers of Democracy: Embedding Democratic Values in Moldova and Ukraine" project of the CEU Center for European Neighborhood Studies is to facilitate embedding democratic values in the societal ethos in Moldova and Ukraine by providing a forum for discussion of the difficulties of such a complex process and by drawing on the transition experience of the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia).



The project and the publication of this paper have been kindly supported by the International Visegrad Fund (www.visegradfund.org).

The opinions expressed here are those of the author.

About the author

Adam Reichardt New Eastern Europe

Adam Reichardt is the Editor in chief of *New Eastern Europe*, an English-language bimonthly magazine published in Poland dedicated to Central and Eastern European affairs. He previously spent eight years in public policy in Washington DC, as well as a large portion of his studies in Cracow, Poland, where he now permanently resides. Adam has an MA in Public Administration and a BA in Political Science and International Relations. In 2012, he was nominated for the European Press Prize in the category of "Editing" for his work on *New Eastern Europe* and was most recently named to the "New Europe 100" list of the region's top innovators.

The Challenge of Embedding Democratic Values in Central and Eastern Europe

Two steps forward, one step back

Introduction: From transition to reality

It is worth noting that generally speaking the countries of Central Europe after 1989 and the post-Soviet states, in this case Ukraine and Moldova, after the fall of the Soviet Union, were in relatively similar socio-economic positions. Even though size and level of development varied across Central Europe and the post-Soviet space, there are many comparable data points worthy of taking into consideration. If we compare the situation of Poland and Ukraine in 1990, for example, we can see that in fact, similar initial economic conditions were in place. In 1990, the GDP per capita in purchasing power parity were nearly identical. States in both post-communist Central Europe and the post-Soviet Eastern Europe had centrally planned economies and a political culture that until the end of communism was dominated by a single party and single ideology. Public administration and institutions with similarly massive bureaucracies infiltrated by secret services were present in all the states immediately following the fall of communism.

However, since the end of communism, the paths of post-communist Central Europe and post-Soviet Eastern Europe diverged significantly. Liberal democracy became successful in only a handful of the post-communist states while oligarchies and semi-authoritarian regimes emerged in the rest. The Freedom House index on *Nations in Transit* had already began labelling the Central European states as "Consolidated democracies" as early as the year 2000, with the trend stable more or less since then.² In the countries of Eastern Europe, however, it was quite the opposite. Some of this divergence can be explained by the fact that the Central European states, while satellites of the Soviet Union, were never a part of the Moscow-dominated federation; however, the Baltic states in this case stand out as an example of post-Soviet states following the same path as Central European states, both entering the European Union and NATO at the same time as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. What is more, the fact that these states initially declared their intent to enter the European Union and NATO

¹ Tridico, Pasquale and Zhak Iryna. "A Plea for Change". *Tyzhden*, August 10, 2014. Accessed 27 November 2015. http://m.tyzhden.ua/publication/121048

² Data for early 2000s found in: Freedom House, *Nations in Transit* 2010. Datatables. Accessed 27 November 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT%202010%20Ratings%20Tables.pdf

early on in the transition process can also explain some of the divergence. The adoption of the *acquis communautaire*, the significant administrative reforms and economic restructuring, and ultimate membership in the EU and NATO which took place in Central Europe are other important explanations for these differences today.

This paper will not discuss the reasons for this divergence. There are plenty of studies and discussions already available on this topic.³ Rather, the focus of this paper will be on the experience of Central Europe as it can be compared to what is happening in Eastern Europe today. In some sense, the launch of the European Union's Eastern Partnership (EaP) programme in 2009 was an opportunity for these countries to restart the path of democratization, move back towards the Western model and integrate with the European Union states. Hence, one thesis to consider here is that it is worth examining the developments of post-1989 in Central Europe and comparing them to post-2009 in Eastern Europe. However, there are many caveats that need to be addressed, as well. Nevertheless, such a discussion is useful in considering the lessons and challenges of embedding democratic values in post-Soviet states.

Democracy: More than elections

Despite the fact that recent indices and studies show that democracy is stable in Central Europe, there are some worrying trends. Already in the early 1990s, at the start of the embrace and implementation of liberal democracy, represented by Francis Fukuyama's infamous claim that the post-Cold War world represented "the end of history"; concerns had emerged that this "victory" would "lead to a 'reverse wave' of renewed autocracy". The case of Central Europe today in fact illustrates that establishing democratic institutions is not enough to guarantee stability. Since 2010, Hungary has been often criticized for its authoritarian backslide, while the 2015 elections in Poland, which brought the Law and Justice party into power, have raised concerns amongst commentators and experts in the West. When examining

³ For some examples see: Bunce, V., Mcfaul, M., and Stoner-Weiss, K., eds, *Democracy And Authoritarianism* in the Postcommunist World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; or Haerpfer, C. W., *Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe*. London and New York: Routledge, 2002; or Antoszewski, A., Kolodii, A., and Kowalczyk, K (eds.) *Transformacja w Polsce i na Ukrainie. Wybrane aspekty (Transformation in Poland and Ukraine, selected aspects)*. Wrocław, Poland: Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT, 2010.

⁴ Ambrosio, Thomas. *Authoritarian Backlash. Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union* Surrey, England: Ashgate Publishing: 2009.

⁵ See Lendvai, P. *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*. New York, USA: Columbia University Press, 2012.

⁶ A prime example is the editorial: "Poland Deviates from Democracy", *New York Times*. Jan 13, 2016. Accessed Jan 26, 2016: http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/13/opinion/poland-deviates-from-democracy.html.

the democratic extent of a country, it is not enough to look at simple factors such as "free and fair elections" as the only requirement for democracy. As we are reminded by Jose Thompson, "Democracy is more than just elections". In other words, democratic values need to be embedded in all institutions, private and public, in order to truly function properly. This includes effective governance, transparency, equality and equal treatment as well as a respect for the rule of law, checks and balances and pluralism.

While economic data can be used to argue that the post-communist transition is in good shape in Central European states, the mentality and social mindset still lags behind Western Europe. A Pew Research Centre survey from 2009 illustrates that there is in fact an overall negative tendency in the faith in democracy and capitalism as a system in Central and Eastern Europe. According to Pew, "the initial widespread enthusiasm about these changes has dimmed in most of the countries surveyed; in some, support for democracy and capitalism has diminished markedly."

This is particularly visible in some Eastern European post-Soviet states where many citizens feel that the elite are the ones who are enjoying the benefits of capitalism at the expense of the people. In Moldova, for example, a recent banking scandal took place where one billion US dollars has disappeared from the three main banks. The scandal unfolded under the watch of the pro-European and pro-democratic government. As a result of the scandal, Moldova's capital saw large protests of nearly 70,000 people demanding that the government resigns.⁹

Similarly, the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution in Ukraine was a dynamic illustration of the society's desire for change. The demands of the protesters were similar to the demands of post-communist societies in the 1990s: more democratic values in the state. After nearly 25 years of post-Soviet development, the Ukrainian political elite was corrupt and public administration was functioning poorly with the private and public sector enterprises dominated by oligarchs whose primary aim was to enhance their own personal wealth. The revolution began in November 2013 with a protest against the former president, Viktor Yanukovych, and his decision to not sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Once the authorities began using force against the protesters, the revolution became inflamed and resulted in Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine and a new pro-European government taking power.

However, in line with the argumentation outlined above, a revolution followed by democratic elections is not enough to ensure the embedding of

⁷ Thompson, Jose. "Participation, Democracy and Human Rights" in Ramazani, R.K. and Fatton, Robert, eds. *The Future of Liberal Democracy: Thomas Jefferson and the Contemporary World*. (New York, USA: Palgrave Macmillan) p. 236.

⁸ Pew Research Center (2009) "Two Decades After The Wall's Fall End Of Communism Cheered But Now With More Reservations" accessed Nov 27th 2015: http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2009/11/Pew-Global-Attitudes-2009-Pulse-of-Europe-Report-Nov-2-1030am-NOT-EMBARGOED.pdf

⁹ Całus, Kamil. "A Moldovan Impasse," *New Eastern Europe*. October 5, 2015. Accessed Nov 27th 2015: http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1731-a-moldovan-impasse.

democratic values. Many examples can be cited here such as the earlier Orange Revolution in Ukraine, but also the Arab Spring in countries like Egypt or Libya. The transition from revolution to democracy is only the first step in a long path towards becoming a full-fledged democratic state. Equally important is what happens afterwards including: a change in the elite; lustration or reconciliation with old regime; and significant external support from the West. This was true also for Central Europe. Even though the revolutions in Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary were bloodless, they were also the first steps for these countries on the road to democracy, which is a long march, oftentimes consisting of two steps forward and one step back; demonstrated by the current backsliding mentioned earlier.

Yet, for Central Europe after 1989 the largest incentive, which was also a catalyst for the democratic developments, was membership in the European Union. This was a goal from almost the outset and one that allowed the four Visegrad countries to combine efforts in order to achieve it. As Nina Bandeli and Bogdan Radu explain, what facilitated democratic consolidation in Central Europe was, first and foremost, its commitment to the reforms on behalf of the elite. But what was most important were "the transnational forces, in particular those integral to the preparation of a country for the European Union membership, which kept these societies on track of its democratic consolidation. This means that significant wavs Europeanization fostered democracy in Central and Eastern Europe."10

This is evidence of the role that the European Union can play as a motivator and where the lessons from Central Europe after 1989 can be drawn for the countries that have declared a pro-EU path since 2009 (such as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia). To emphasize this point, Frank Schimmelfennig wrote in 2009 that states "turn to the EU as a result of dissatisfaction with the domestic status quo." Schimmelfennig argues that indeed the EU could be seen as a solution to Eastern Europe; as it had been for Central Europe.

This leads to the next part of the discussion which is a brief comparison of the situation as it was with Central Europe leading to its accession to the European Union in 2004; and the situation with the countries today in Eastern Europe, primarily Ukraine and Moldova, since the launch of the EU's Eastern Partnership in 2009. This comparison will help us better understand the chances for and challenges ahead regarding the embedding of democratic values in these new states.

¹⁰ Nina Bandelj, Bogdan Radu p.16

¹¹ Schimmelfennig, Frank. "Europeanization beyond Europe." *Living Reviews in European Governance*, Vol. 4, No.3 (2009), p. 7.

Transition efforts – Lessons learnt and today's challenge

In debates on Eastern Europe and Eastern Partnership countries, many voices aim to argue that the transition experience from Central Europe can be exported as an example for the post-Soviet states in Eastern Europe. ¹² Indeed, similarities do exist, as do many differences. The economic situation in Ukraine after the Euromaidan revolution, for example, can be compared to that of Poland post-communist change in 1990. If we recall, in the early 1990s, Central Europe faced an economic situation characterized by "high inflation and major recessions as economic linkages broke down." ¹³ In Ukraine, the inflation rate has hit nearly 50% from 2014 to 2015, while the economic situation in other post-Soviet states continues to suffer. Therefore, from a purely economic standpoint we can say that the starting points are similar. Ukraine and other Eastern European states would do well to follow the economic liberalization reform path that took place in Central Europe after 1989.

That argument, however, is most useful for economic reforms and less for democratic ones. In discussing the democratization of Eastern Europe and the embedding of democratic values, we need to first understand that context is very important. Here, there are several differences that need to be contrasted before understanding the lessons we can apply from Central Europe. Some of the major areas that should be looked at deeper include: the global and geopolitical situation (including the situation inside the European Union), regional cooperation, internal factors and the role of the civil society.

Geopolitical context

In the early 1990s in Central Europe, there seemed to have been little doubt that democratization was the path that these countries would take. The democratic movements that emerged in Central Europe before the fall of communism, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland or the Hungarian Democratic Forum, became the basis for future democratic developments. After the fall of the Soviet Union, there was little attempt by the Russian Federation to stop these states from their rapprochement with Europe. The weakness of Russia and its focus on its own internal problems, as well as maintaining a significant level of influence in the former Soviet states, allowed for some breathing room for Central Europe to pursue European integration.

¹² The most recent volume that exemplifies this: Berti, B. Mikulova, K. and Popescu, N., eds. *Democratization in EU Foreign Policy: New member states as drivers of democracy promotion* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

¹³ Roaf, J., Atoyan, R. Joshi, B., and Krogulski, K. "25 Years of Transition: Post-communist Europe and the IMF" Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 2014, p5.

Ukraine and Moldova, however, are in very different geopolitical situations. Both countries have significant problems with their own territorial integrity as a result of Russian intervention. In Moldova, the breakaway republic of Transnistria, which declared independence in 1990, remains a territory that is outside the control of the Moldovan authorities and heavily under the influence of and significantly supported by the Kremlin. Ukraine is in a similar situation with the Crimean peninsula being occupied and annexed by the Russian Federation, while a significant portion of the Donbas Region in eastern Ukraine is being controlled by rebel separatists strongly supported by Russia. An active war has been taking place there since spring 2014 and Russia is aiming to use peace negotiations to maintain a level of influence on Ukrainian territory. The countries of Central Europe, on the other hand, had no such situation. This will significantly impede the democratization process as there are divisions within the society as well as strong external pressure in Ukraine and Moldova.

Another important distinction to make when discussing external factors is the role of the European Union. Throughout the 1990s, the public debate in Central Europe was generally dominated by the desire for a "return to Europe". As Heinisch and Landsberger note, "this term had highly symbolic implications by expressing not only a historic aspiration but also by serving as a rallying cry to overcome a legacy of political and economic conditions that were seen as obstacles for integration with Europe." ¹⁴ By the late 1990s, accession to the EU seemed inevitable as negotiations began with the Central European states. For many Western Europeans, the EU expansion was also seen with optimism and as a chance for unity in Europe which began with German reunification and the end of the Cold War. In other words, the mood was quite "Euro-enthusiastic".

The situation in Moldova and Ukraine, as well as the European Union, today is unfortunately not as positive. As a result of the scandals and slow reform processes in Moldova, support for integration with the EU has reached a historical low (32%) in 2015. While we can generally say there is a pro-European mood in Moldova, especially among young people, it is not as enthusiastic as in Central Europe in the 1990s. Further, there is still significant support (some estimates indicate almost 50 % of the society) for integration in some form with the Russian Federation. In Ukraine, the society's approach to the EU is much different, mainly as a result of the revolution and the geopolitical situation. A recent poll noted around 50%

¹⁴ Reinhard Heinisch and Christa Landsberger "'Returning to Europe' – East Central Europe's Complex Relationship with European Integration and its Repercussions. Published online at <a href="https://www.uni-salzburg.at/fileadmin/multimedia/Politikwissenschaft%20und%20Soziologie/documents/Heinisch-Landsberger East Central Europe%E2%80%99s Complex Relationship with European Integration.pdf accessed Jan 13th 2016.

¹⁵ Calus, Kamil. "Escalation of anti-government feeling in Moldova". Osrodek Studiow Wschodnich (Warsaw), June 10th 2015. Accessed November 27th 2015: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-06-10/escalation-anti-government-feeling-moldova.

Adam Reichardt

The Challenge of Embedding Democratic Values in Central and Eastern Europe Two steps forward, one step back

support for greater European integration with only 17% in support of integration with Russia. 16

The situation in the EU is also different as there is a marked increase of Euroscepticism and a decrease in pro-EU sentiments primarily as a result of the ongoing crises that the EU faces, most importantly the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis and the Greek debt crisis. Since the last round of enlargement in 2013, which added Croatia to the EU, attitudes towards further enlargement are distinctly negative both among EU citizens and member state governments. While overall data on enlargement attitudes vary by EU member state, it was concluded by Schimmelfennig, et al. in 2015 that when combined, "the most recent surveys of EU public opinion point to a considerable 'enlargement fatigue' among EU citizens." ¹⁷

Regional cooperation

As mentioned earlier, in 2009, the European Union launched the Eastern Partnership program which aimed to better integrate six post-Soviet states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) with the EU. The launch of this program had a strong regional component encouraging multilateral cooperation amongst the EaP members; comparable to that of the Visegrad countries' close cooperation. The results of this multilateral dimension of the EaP are thus far mixed. Nevertheless, the main success of the EaP has been the bilateral agreements between each individual state and the EU, namely the signing of the Association Agreements and the EU free trade agreements with three of the countries, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. If implemented properly, these agreements will lead to better integration in the long term with the European Union. Unfortunately, multilateral cooperation has little connection to this success.

Moreover, since signing the agreements with the EU, there is still no public mention of EU candidate status for these states. When comparing with the experience of the Visegrad states, it is clear that the EU's impact on domestic change was unprecedented thanks in part to the candidate status that these countries were offered at the end of the 1990s. "The EU's accession conditionality – tying the reward of membership to candidate countries' compliance with conditions set by the EU – played a key role in this process." By not explicitly offering Ukraine and Moldova candidate status to the European Union, the EU creates a greater challenge for motivation in

¹⁶ "Over half of Ukrainians support EU integration – poll" published on 112.ua. Accessed Feb 6th 2016: http://112.international/society/over-half-of-ukrainians-support-eu-integration-poll-2325.html

¹⁷ Schimmelfennig, F., et al. "Enlargement and the Integration Capacity of the EU Interim Scientific Results." Published by Freie Universität Berlin under the framework of the MAXCAP (May, 2015). Accessed Feb 6th 2016: http://maxcap-

project.eu/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/reports/maxcap_report_01.pdf

¹⁸ Sedelmeier, Ulrich. "Europe after the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: 2004-2014". Published by Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung (June 10th 2014). Accessed November 27th 2015: http://eu.boell.org/sites/default/files/uploads/2014/06/eastern_enlargement.pdf

embedding democratic values in society and institutions. This should be a serious lesson drawn from the experience of Central Europe.

Internal factors

Lastly, the internal situation in the states of Eastern Europe has taken a very different developmental path since the end of communism and makes it difficult to compare with the post-1989 situation in Central Europe. Countries like Moldova and Ukraine have a much steeper curve when it comes to reforming their states in order to ensure democratic values and ideals are in place in their systems. Both countries face significantly high levels of corruption. In 2015, Transparency international ranked Ukraine 130 and Moldova 103 respectively out of 168 countries in terms of corruption; this compares to Poland (30), the Czech Republic (37), Slovakia (50) or Hungary (50).¹⁹ Small reforms are taking place, however, and Ukraine is now in the process of instituting lustration activities as well as instituting an anticorruption bureau, largely based on the Polish experience. This is a positive development. However, corruption is so endemic in Ukrainian public administration that it requires massive reforms and there are already signs of resistance to these. This was best illustrated during the high-profile resignation of Ukraine's Minister of Economic Development and Trade on February 3, 2016, Aivaras Abromavicius, claiming that "any kind of systemic reform is decisively blocked."20

Politics and public administration remain major areas that require reform in the countries of Eastern Europe. Adding transparency to financing of political parties and professionalising the civil service are some steps that can be taken in order to create more democratic foundations. Building a higher regard for the rule of law will also be critical. Many of these changes are reforms that cannot only take place on paper. These require also a significant change in mentality. Some changes in Ukraine on decentralisation, following the model of Poland, are a good start. Yet, much more work needs to be done on increasing transparency in decision-making, the use of financial resources and providing free access of information to the public. The bank scandal in Moldova exemplifies how this can fail, with 1 billion US dollars disappearing without a trace.

Lastly, there is no doubt that the civil society is a key player in the democratization process that is taking place in Eastern Europe. As opposed to the case of Central Europe, which was a much more top-down approach to

¹⁹ Data taken from Transparency International; data from 2015. Accessed Feb 6th 2016: https://www.transparency.org/country.

²⁰ "Statement by the Minister of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine Aivaras Abromavicius," February 3rd 2016. Accessed Feb 6th 2016: http://www.me.gov.ua/News/Detail?lang=en-GB&id=f13fa574-3e1b-4eca-b294-

 $[\]underline{f9e508910e01\&title=StatementByTheMinisterOfEconomicDevelopmentAndTradeOfUkraineAivarasAbro} \\ \underline{mavicius}$

democratization, the civil society in Eastern Europe is creating a bottom-up approach to force greater openness and accountability among public officials. This can be explained by the fact that at the end of the 1980s in Central Europe, due to the nature of the authoritarian regime, there was a very nascent civil society so it developed together with the transition to democracy. Over the last 20 years in Eastern Europe, on the other hand, civil society has been allowed to grow even if the public sphere had not strongly democratized itself. During the recent Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine, we saw how strong these movements, and their supporters, can be. With the help of social media and new technologies we see democratic values being applied in new ways.

Lessons unlearnt? Negative trends in Central Europe

To conclude this discussion, it is more than obvious to state that Eastern Europe has a long way to go in order to reach the same level of democratic consolidation that is seen in Central Europe. It is indeed on the "democratic frontiers" of Europe. That said, there are some positive developments that need to be further nurtured in order to strengthen the role of values in these reforms. There is no doubt about the power of European Union membership perspective as we learnt from the example of Central Europe. Providing such a perspective can be a very important symbolic first step in assisting the reform process and providing the civil society with greater energy to force reforms on behalf of the elite. The Eastern Partnership can be a platform for this process. It is also important to add that if Europeanization and democratization should happen from the bottom-up, there needs to be greater engagement on behalf of the EU as well as European NGOs in the region. We do not want these movements to be hijacked by non-democratic forces.

Lastly, as mentioned earlier, the current situation overall in Europe is much less optimistic than it was in the beginning of the 1990s, and this will play an important role in the Europeanization of Eastern Europe. What's more, negative trends in terms of democracy and the rule of law are slowly emerging in the Central European states; indicating a backslide (as mentioned in the beginning) from the successes achieved over the last 25 years. Hungary has been the most scrutinized in this process. Since coming to power in 2010, the ruling Fidesz party changed the constitution and election system in efforts to institute what Prime Minister Victor Orban calls "illiberal democracy": a system which sees much more state control and less transparency in power structures. The results of elections in 2015 in Poland, where the right-wing Law and Justice party was elected to power, have shown similar developments to those that have already taken place in Hungary. New laws passed in both these countries give greater power to the

ruling elite over public media, public administration as well as the judicial and election systems.

Hence, these developments force us to ask the question – to what extent are democratic values actually embedded in the post-communist states of Central Europe? Despite the belief that the transition can be a model for Eastern Europe, these emerging challenges now require a renewed analysis. What's more, on top of these challenges is a growing sense of Euroscepticism, in both Western and Central Europe. Therefore, a final conclusion from this discussion may be drawn: perhaps it is not enough to embed democratic values in the system, but they must be continuously cultivated and addressed. Without this continuous attention to further propagation of democratic values, it indeed sets up a situation where backslides can occur. Hopefully, these backslides are only temporary.

Frontiers of Democracy

Embedding Democratic Values in Moldova and Ukraine
2016

Adam Reichardt

The Challenge of Embedding Democratic Values in Central and Eastern Europe

Two steps forward, one step back

Published:

Center for European Neighborhood Studies Central European University

Contact:

Nádor utca 9, Budapest, H-1052, Hungary

Tel.: + 36 1 237-3000 ext. 2391

cens@ceu.edu

