Adversarial politics, civic virtues and partisanship in Eastern and Western Europe

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Introduction

The literature on democracy and democratisation regards partisanship as one of the best indicators of the rootedness of party systems and, indeed, of liberal democracy itself (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Huntington 1968; Rose and Mishler 1998; Morlino and Montero 1995). Accordingly, the absence of long-term emotional attachments to parties is seen as a worrying sign of the fragility of representative democracy.[1] Yet the central role attributed to partisanship rests on a number of implicit assumptions about the role of parties in integrating citizens into the democratic order. In order to assess the validity of these assumptions we need to know more about the causes and effects of partisanship or, at the very least, about the relationship between partisanship and other political variables.

This chapter examines both Western European and post-communist Eastern European countries in order to identify the sources and consequences of partisanship at both the individual and aggregate levels. Our analysis reveals that partisanship depends more on attitudes, institutions and the length of democratic traditions, than on social backgrounds. We demonstrate the validity of the well-known assumption that 'bright' or 'civic' feelings are associated with partisanship, such as political efficacy and knowledge. But also, and somewhat more importantly, we identify conflict-related, 'darker' sentiments, like highly differentiated feelings towards parties (both love and hate) and perceptions of party polarisation (Crewe 1976). Next to the length of democratic experience, the polarized

nature of party competition and the existence of institutions that foster clear governmental responsibility also contribute to the level of partisanship. Eastern Europe differs from Western Europe only in few – but nonetheless noteworthy – regards. In the East, for example, partisanship increases radicalism, while in the West it strengthens satisfaction with democracy. It appears, therefore, that while the sources of partisanship are similar the consequences of partisanship differ between East and West.

Partisanship at the individual level

A great deal of the literature on the sources of partisanship has been concerned with the analysis of parental influence and the 'inheritance' of political allegiances (Campbell 1960; Jennings and Nemi 1968; Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974). This focus on the family is understandable. After all, the family is *the* central institution in most societies and it is where most individuals learn their roles (Monroe et al. 2000; Smith and Mackie 2007). The process of social learning, moreover, occurs before citizens acquire any direct experience of politics and can help structure later political attitudes. The causal arrows thus flow unambiguously *from* family *to* partisanship. The focus on family also helps to distinguish partisan identification from attitudes that are the product of political experiences and of rational considerations of benefits (cf. Achen 2002).[2]

But the focus on family may lead to the underestimation of the social and political character of the phenomenon, and may produce trivial findings. In this chapter, therefore, we look at both the more remote and more political variables. Accordingly we exclude from the analysis factors like the ideological distance from the preferred party, liking of the party

leader or electoral choice. The theoretical rationale for the selection of the analysed variables is explained below.

Attachment to a party can be a direct function of the mobilisation effort of the parties. The voters of leftist or religious mass parties typically exhibit more intensive commitment (Norris 2004). Alternatively, partisanship can be conceived as an element of social integration, reflecting membership of the most affluent and dynamic parts of the society. According to empirical findings the typical partisan tends to be indeed male, old, married, an urban dweller and a higher status citizen (Campbell 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996; Norris 2004; Schmitt and Holmberg 1995).[3]

Based on the social integration approach one would expect education to be positively related to partisanship. But cognitive mobilisation theory asserts that parties are rather old-fashioned institutions, less able to appeal to the social elites than, for example, social movements and single issue organisations (Dalton 1984; Inglehart 1977). Parties should be more popular among the more traditional and less educated groups in society. Using different arguments functional theories of partisanship would also predict a negative relationship between sophistication and attachment to parties. These theories assume that partisan attachments perform an information cost reduction function. Consequently those citizens who have difficulties orienting themselves via an individualized consumption of political information should be more likely to align themselves with parties (Butler and Stokes 1969; Goldberg 1969; Miller 1976; Shively 1979). Previous empirical research produced findings that support both expectations. Norris (2005), for example, found that

there was a positive relationship between education and partisanship, while Berglund et al. (2005) found exactly the opposite.[4]

The relationship of partisanship to *political* integration is also ambiguous. The politically integrated, that is those who internalize democratic norms, who follow politics attentively and think that participating in the political process is worthwhile, can be expected to develop partisan attachments. A belief in the importance of politics and elections together with an accurate knowledge of the political process are civic virtues that characterize 'ideal' citizens (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). But partisanship can also be associated with a less civic, less 'bright' attitudes. Engagement in politics is often rooted in dissatisfaction with the status-quo and in the rejection of certain ideologies, which suggests that partisanship is based, at least in part, on conflict (Scarbrough 1984; Bartle 1998). This source of partisanship should lead one to expect partisanship to be associated with a polarized view of politics ('subjective polarisation'). Those who see large ideological differences between parties and who react with extreme emotional responses to them (that is who love some and hate others) ought to have a stronger sense of partisanship.

To summarise, partisanship can have not only 'bright' and 'civic' but also 'dark' or 'adversarial' causes or consequences. Parties are, after all, agents of *both* integration *and* division. Partisan attachment may lead to regime support and acceptance of the prevailing political (democratic) order but it might also foster radicalism, or even extremism.

Partisanship at the aggregate level

Partisanship at the national level is expected to be shaped by the same factors that influence partisanship at an individual level. There are, however, additional factors that operate only at the aggregate level. One such factor is the longevity of the party system. It takes time for partisanship to develop (Campbell 1960; Converse 1966). Ideological polarisation of the party system should have the same effect, since parties that offer distinct ideological alternatives are more likely to foster emotional attachments.[5]

Political systems in which parties are the principal players should also produce higher levels of partisanship. Political parties have a central role when responsibility for outcomes can be clearly assigned and election results have a definite impact on government policies. This is particularly the case in unicameral parliamentary regimes where the president is not directly elected.

Another fundamental characteristic of party systems, fragmentation, has a less clear relationship with partisanship. On the one hand, if there are few parties then policy making depends less on coalition bargaining and responsibility for outcomes is more clearly assigned. On the other hand, if there are more parties, people can choose from a larger menu and are more likely to find a party that they can feel comfortable about aligning themselves with.

In addition to the above national level social, attitudinal and institutional factors we expect East-West differences to influence the level of partisan attachments. Eastern European

citizens have been typically found to be less emotionally involved with parties than their counterparts in the West (Mair 1997; Rose 1995; Wyman et al. 1995; Plasser 1998; but see also Norris 2005).[6] Scholars have pointed to various factors that inhibit party system institutionalisation all over the post-communist world: the weakness and instability of socio-political differentiation (meaning, in its moderate version, a lack of cleavages, or, in its more radical formulation, the complete atomisation of the society), widespread alienation from the political system, elite-driven political transitions, the unusually large influence of electronic media, inherited anti-party sentiments, weak civil society, international constraints on government activities, and limited democratic experience (Enyedi 2006; Evans and Whitefield 1993; Katz 1996; Mair 1997; Hanley 2001). These factors make parties unpopular, increase electoral volatility, reduce turnout and party membership, weaken party organisations and reduce partisan loyalty among politicians.

Partisanship can be expected to be feeble in Eastern Europe also because direct parental transfer of partisanship can occur in relatively few cases. To be sure, some of those parties that competed in elections before the Communist takeover were resurrected in a number of countries. In some cases party preferences can be still related to the preferences that existed in the past in one's family, neighbourhood or social group during childhood and adolescence. Wittenberg (2006) has, for example, demonstrated a surprising degree of continuity in voting preferences between 1947 and 1990 in Hungary. He was even able to trace back the transmission of political orientation to specific social actors such as local priests. But the lack of democratic continuity of party labels and of politicized mass organisations has reduced the relevance of socialisation mechanisms. Not surprisingly,

most of those parties that pre-date the Communist period were unsuccessful after the re-emergence of democracy.

The often reported low levels of partisanship in Eastern Europe raise questions about functional explanations of party identification (Miller 1976). One could argue that people need the guidance provided by partisanship exactly in the midst of large scale social, political and economic changes. But the frequent changes of party labels may impede the development of stable partisan attachments, whatever the psychological needs of the individual voters. The social-psychological theory of party identification assumed that parties exist independently of the leaders and so are able to survive the mistakes of transient leaders (Campbell 1960; Butler and Stokes 1969, 1974). As the disappearance of a number of significant parties demonstrates this is not always the case in Eastern Europe.

Based on these differences between the two regions we expect lower partisanship in the East and, since familial socialisation is of somewhat less importance, a greater role for ideological and emotional polarisation in shaping partisanship. We also expect that partisans should have a higher social status in the East, given the generally elitist nature of party politics (Rose and Mishler 1998). We further expect to find the opposite relationship in the two regions in case of education and age. If the cognitive mobilisation theory of new politics is right, education should be negatively related to partisanship in the post-industrial West and positively related in the less developed East. An even more drastic difference between East and West is the expected relationship between partisanship and age. In the West we expect a strong positive relationship since partisanship has been found to be

related positively to age in almost all established democracies (see Abramson 1979 for an exception). This relationship between the life cycle and partisanship has been at the core of the Michigan theory of party identification (Campbell 1960: 161-9; Butler and Stokes 1969: 55-9). Identification is supposed to crystallize at a certain age and be reinforced by repeated voting. In new democracies, however, there should be a negative correlation because older people were socialized under authoritarian regimes. Young people are more likely to hold liberal-democratic principles and are repeatedly found to be the strongest supporters of multiparty politics (Rose and Carnaghan 1995; Miller 1998). They are, therefore, more likely to accept party labels and think of themselves as supporters of a particular party.

Data and operationalisation

The principal data come from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) but we analyse only European countries.[7] Countries were grouped into two categories: West (including Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, France, Britain, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, Denmark, Ireland and Spain), and East (Bulgaria, Hungary, Belarus, Lithuania, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Poland, Russia, Slovenia and Romania).[8] Switzerland, Czech Republic, Spain, Hungary, the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Britain, Norway, Portugal, Poland, Russia and Spain have been surveyed twice. As a result there are thirty-nine samples and 66,996 respondents in our data set.[9]

Partisanship is operationalized using three CSES questions:

(1) 'Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?'

(2) 'Do you feel very close to this party, somewhat close, or not very close?'

(3) 'Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?'

Based on these questions we created two indicators. The first treats as partisans only those who answered yes to question (1). The second indicator ranges between 1 and 8. Those who answered yes to the question (1) were divided in three groups according to how they answered question (2): those who chose 'very close' scored 8, those who chose 'somewhat close' or 'don't know' scored 7 and those who chose 'not very close' scored 6. Those who responded 'don't' know' to the first question but 'yes' to question (3) were scored 5. Those who responded 'no' to the first question but 'yes' to the question (3) were scored 4, those who responded 'don't know' to the first question and 'no' to the third question were scored as 3, while those who said 'no' to the first question and 'don't know' to the third were scored as 2. Finally, those who said 'no' to both first and third question were scored as 1.[10]

'Civic dispositions' are operationalized by two variables that tap efficacy and political knowledge. Efficacy was measured as the mean score on two questions: 'Some people say it makes a difference who is in power. Others say that it doesn't make a difference who is in power. Where would you place yourself?' and 'Some people say that no matter who people vote for, it won't make any difference to what happens. Others say that who people vote for can make a difference to what happens.' 'Political knowledge' was operationalized by the number of correct answers provided to the three CSES political information questions. 'Satisfaction with democracy' is based on responses to a Likert-type item ('On

the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in [country]?').

Ideological radicalism was defined as the squared distance between the respondents' left-right self-placement and the supposed neutral point of the scale (5 on the 11-point CSES scale). This variable ranges from 0 indicating centrist position to 25 indicating the most extreme position.

'Subjective polarisation' was operationalized by two variables: affective polarisation and perception of ideological polarisation. 'Affective polarisation' was measured by the standard deviation of the values assigned to the various parties on a like-dislike question ('I'd like to know what you think about each of our political parties. After I read the name of a political party, please rate it on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means you strongly dislike that party and 10 means that you strongly like that party'). Higher standard deviation indicates larger differences in the attitudes towards different parties. 'Perception of ideological polarisation' was measured by the standard deviation of the values assigned to the parties on the left-right dimension ('In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. Where would you place party x on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?') Higher scores indicate perceptions of larger ideological differences between the parties.

To capture whether a political system creates obstacles to party-based governments we created a simple summed scale entitled 'lack of constraints' consisting of two variables:

whether the president is directly elected (scored 1 if directly elected, 0 otherwise) and whether there is an effective second chamber (scored 1 if there is an effective second chamber, 0 otherwise).[11] The structure of the legislature was classified as follows: Bulgaria, Finland, France, Britain, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Portugal, Spain and Ukraine as unicameral or quasi unicameral (with a very weak second chamber), while Belgium, Belarus, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Germany and Romania were classified as having a relatively effective second chamber. The information on the direct election of the president also came from the CSES survey. Party system fragmentation was measured by the Rae indices ($1-\Sigma p_i^2$, where p is the parties' share of seats) found in the Armingeon and Armingeon and Careja data-sets.[12] Party system polarisation was measured by taking the CSES expert judgments of the left-right position of individual parties and simply calculating the distance between the two most-extreme parties. Finally, the age of party system was defined as the average of 'year party founded' variable subtracted from the election year. Weighting of these scores by party size (according to electoral returns) did not produce substantive differences.

Reported levels of partisanship

Table 9.1 reports the percentage of those who answered 'yes' to the standard partisanship question 'Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?' Differences in question wording may explain the differences with other studies (see Kaase 1976; Abramson and Ostrom 1991) but within our data-set the questions were identical (except for translations) across all countries. Most surveys were conducted a few weeks after actual elections and therefore the results may overestimate the degree of partisanship,

since voters may 'rationalise' their behaviour by indicating that they have an enduring loyalty to a party that they have just voted for (Heath and Pierce 1992; cf. McAllister and Wattenberg 1995).

While we feel confident that the CSES question used here conveys rather well what is meant traditionally by partisanship, some of the figures reported in Table 9.1 raise concerns. The high level of reported partisanship in the Ukraine (59.3 per cent) is particularly surprising given the country's fragile party system and the central role played by individual politicians in that country. It is worth noting, however, that different researchers using a different question format produced very similar results (Miller and Klobucar 2000).

Table 9.1 about here

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The difference between East European countries taken together (41.4 per cent) and West (43.6 per cent) is small but statistically significant (weighted for the equal representation of the samples). The difference is, however, influenced by the relatively large proportion of 'don't know' answers in Eastern Europe (7.9 per cent). If partisanship is calculated simply as the ratio between 'yes' and 'no' answers, the pattern of responses in the East (45.5) and West (44.9) are virtually equal. According to our 8-point measure average partisanship in Eastern Europe is, however, significantly lower (4.27 compared to 4.58, $p<.001$).

Still, the level of partisanship in Eastern Europe appears surprisingly high in light of the literature reviewed above. And if one relates these figures to turnout, the importance of partisanship appears as even larger. Since turnout in Eastern Europe is about 10 per cent

lower than in the West, the percentage of the active electorate without any partisanship is actually somewhat *larger* in Western Europe (29 per cent) than in the East (20 per cent).

The correlates of partisanship at the individual level

In this section we examine the association between partisanship and social characteristics. As expected those who are or have been married have stronger partisan attachments than singles both in East and in the West. In the East 43 per cent of married people are partisans compared with 35 per cent of unmarried couples. In the West the figures are 45 and 35 per cent respectively. Men also tend to be more partisan than women in both regions. In the East 45 per cent of men are partisans compared with 39 per cent of women. In the West the figures are 46 and 41 per cent.

Table 9.2 reports Pearson correlation coefficients between various social background variables and our 8-point partisanship scale. Older people are stronger partisans than the young in the West, as expected. Contrary to our expectations, however, the same applies to Eastern Europe, although the relationship is not significant in Hungary 2002, Romania 1996, Belarus 2001, and also Spain 1996 (not shown). In general the correlation coefficients are somewhat smaller in Eastern Europe (r=0.11, p<.001) than in Western Europe (r=0.13, p<.001).

Table 9.2 about here

Education is related weakly and positively to partisanship both in the East and in the West (r=0.08 each). This correlation goes up to 0.10 (East) and 0.13 (West) if one controls for age. In contrast with Berglund et al. (2005) we do not find negative relationship between education and partisanship in either of the regions under study. The strongest positive association (not shown in Table 9.2) is observed in Switzerland 1999 (r=0.20, p<.001), followed by Poland 1997 (r=0.21), and Romania (r=0.24). The relationship is insignificant in a number of cases but no significant negative association was obtained across all the countries.

Income was also positively, but even more weakly related to partisanship (0.05 and 0.06 in the two regions). A somewhat stronger association was observed in Germany and Poland (0.16 and 0.17 respectively), and again we found no significant negative association (though the coefficients for Denmark, Russia and Ukraine approached significance in that direction). The socio-economic status of the respondents (whether one is white-collar, worker, farmer or self-employed) has somewhat stronger impact in the East (contingency coefficient= 0.18) than in the West (0.12). Eastern white-collar workers are somewhat more partisan than their Western counterparts, while Western blue collar workers have somewhat stronger partisanship than the Eastern working class. The difference is large among farmers: Westerners are more partisan than their Eastern counterparts but these findings are based on a small number of cases. Urbanisation is not associated with partisanship in either of the regions. The expected positive association materialized in Poland 1997 (r=0.13) and Romania (r=0.14), but negative coefficients appeared in Russia 2000 (r=-0.12), and Denmark 1998 (r=-0.13). Contrary to our expectations social status is only slightly more

strongly related to partisanship in the East, and in general the relationships are rather weak. But it is also clear that the less well-off, less integrated segments of the society are less likely to score highly on our partisanship scale.

Religious service attendance has a very weak association with partisanship, but in this case the relationships have the opposite directions in the two regions: it is slightly negative (r=-0.04) in the East and positive (r=0.03) in the West. The negative relationship in the East is due to the mobilisation of the non-attending. The same difference, though even weaker, appears on the religious self-definition item (r=-0.01 in East and r=0.04 in West) (not reported in table 9.2). One of the countries that contributes to this negative sign in the East is Poland, which clearly confounds the expectation that the presence of religious parties would foster a positive relationship.[13] In all these cases, however, the relationship is statistically insignificant.

Table 9.3 presents the association between attitudes and partisanship. In this case it is more difficult to draw any conclusions about the causal impact of these variables on partisanship since they may well be – at least in part – consequences of partisan attachments. Stronger partisans are, however, more satisfied with how democracy works in the West (r=0.11), while in the East this relationship is insignificant. Moreover, more detailed analyses (not reported here) show that in a number of countries, like Romania, the more dissatisfied are actually slightly more likely to be attached to parties. Stronger partisans are more efficacious (think that it matters who is in power and that their vote makes a difference) in

both East (r=0.23) and West (r=0.24). Political knowledge is also positively correlated with partisanship. The relationship is stronger, however, in the East (r=0.25) than West (r=0.16).

Table 9.3 about here

In line with our expectations, 'affective polarisation' and the perception of ideological (left-right) polarisation among parties correlate positively with partisanship. The perception of polarisation, measured by the standard deviation of the party left-right scores assigned by respondents, was related moderately to partisanship in the West (r=0.17) and in the East (r=0.16). The most robust relations were found with "affective polarisation": Pearson's correlation coefficients were r=0.34 in the West and r=0.38 in the East.[14]

Those who reported themselves to be on the left and right proved to be almost equally partisan, though the extreme left was slightly more partisan than the extreme right in Eastern Europe (Figure 9.1).[15] Centrist positions appear to indicate a lack of identification rather than identification with centrist parties. This indicates that partisanship has a strong directional component and those at the extremes have stronger partisanship. Consequently the correlation between ideological radicalism and partisanship is positive and highly significant in both regions, though higher in the East (r=0.29) than the West (r=0.21).[16]

Figure 9.1 about here

Predicting individual partisanship with socio-demographic and political variables

Table 9.4 displays a regression in which partisanship is the dependent variable and a range of socio-demographics ('the usual suspects') independent variables. For the sake of comparability, all the variables here (and in Table 9.5) are recoded to range from 0 to 1. Age, gender, education, and income are significant predictors of partisanship in both the East and the West (Table 9.4). In both regions older, better educated, and better off males tend to have stronger partisan attachments, though the fit of the model is poor in both cases (R^2s of just 0.03 and 0.04 respectively). There are few differences in the socio-demographic predictors of partisanship between the two regions.

Table 9.4 about here

Table 9.5 clearly shows that political factors are better at predicting partisanship than socio-demographic factors, generating adjusted R^2s of 0.19 in the East and 0.16 in the West. In both regions affective polarisation has the strongest association with partisanship, followed by political efficacy, knowledge and ideological radicalism.

Left-right position has no impact on partisanship net of all these other variables, although in the East the coefficient is almost significant. In this case, as expected, left-wingers are somewhat more partisan than right-wingers (perhaps reflecting the influence of former Communist parties). In the West dissatisfaction with democracy is significantly negatively associated with partisanship, but in the East, strikingly, it isn't. Another major difference between the regions is that in the East perceived ideological polarisation goes together with

low levels of partisanship, while the opposite is the case in the West. Thus, it seems that while the Easterners become disenchanted about parties when they see them standing far apart, Westerners affiliate more strongly with parties when they see significant ideological differences between them.

Table 9.5 about here

Bivariate relations at the macro level

Aggregate level partisanship is expected to be a function of the national averages of individual level variables and the institutional specificities of particular countries. The correlations displayed in Table 9.6, however, suggest that only one variable (the level of affective polarisation) is significantly related to partisanship (Pearson's R=0.37). It is, of course, unsurprising that there are so few significant correlations given the relatively small sample size (N=39). The direction of the relationships is as expected: ideologically radical, leftist, satisfied, efficacious and subjectively polarized societies promote higher levels of partisanship.

Table 9.6 about here

Table 9.7 displays the correlations between institutional characteristics and partisanship.[17] The older, more polarized party systems, without constraints (directly elected president and strong chambers) on party government have higher levels of partisanship than others. The

presence of a larger number of parties correlates with less partisanship, though it is statistically not significant. It seems that greater concentration of power and clearer government responsibility matters more than the fact that citizens can find a party that is close to them.

Table 9.7 about here

Predicting aggregate partisanship

Table 9.8 displays a final regression to assess whether partisanship is higher or lower in Eastern Europe than would have been expected given scores on all other attitudinal variables. This shows that fully 60 per cent of the variance in partisanship scores can be explained by the aggregate level variables discussed above, plus a regional dummy. The 'explained variance' falls to just 48 per cent without the region variable. Only party system polarisation, political efficacy, and, with weaker effect, affective polarisation retain their significant impact. It appears that the best climate for the development of partisanship is to be found in those countries where people think that it matters who is in power, where the ideological span of the party system is large and where citizens tend have strong (both positive and negative) feelings towards parties. After the impact of the control variables has been filtered out, partisanship is still higher in the West.

Table 9.8 about here

Causal mechanisms involving partisanship

In the analyses set out above we have described the relationship between partisanship and a range of psychological or attitudinal variables. We have been reluctant to draw causal inferences because some of the variables could be argued to be either causes or consequences of partisanship. At this stage, however, we put aside such caution and outline what we believe to be a plausible 'causal' model. Among the political variables that have been used to predict partisanship some are more likely to be causes, while others more likely to be consequences of partisanship. We assume that subjective polarisation and civic dispositions are likely to motivate people to engage in political action, while satisfaction with democracy and radicalism are more likely to be shaped by political activity. Consequently, the former were entered into the models as independent and the latter as dependent variables. This format allows us to contrast 'dark' and 'bright' causes and consequences.

'Subjective polarisation' was treated as a latent variable based on two observable indicators: affective polarisation and polarisation of the respondent's estimates of party positions. These are conceived as indicators of emotional and cognitive aspects of a polarized, conflict-centred view of parties. Civic predispositions have been also operationalized as a latent variable with three manifest indicators: the scale measuring political information and the two political efficacy items. Structural equation analyses were performed separately for the two regions, using AMOS software. Initially all possible causal paths were included in these non-recursive models then the statistically insignificant paths were eliminated.

Although the overall fit of the model, as indicated by the chi-square, is less than perfect, RMSEA indicators are quite satisfactory.[18]

Figures 9.2 and 9.3 about here

Figures 9.2 and 3 display the results from the AMOS analysis and help us to identify both commonalities and differences between the two regions. Across Europe partisanship is influenced by both civic virtues and subjective polarisation and the latter factor is more consequential. Although the operationalisation of what we call 'bright' and 'dark' causes is somewhat less than ideal these results indicate that partisanship is at least as much, and probably more, the product of conflict than of integration.

In the West (Figure 9.2) civic disposition functions as a mirror image of subjective polarisation: the first reduces dissatisfaction with democracy (-0.23) and radicalism (-0.05), the latter increases both (0.13 and 0.48). Partisanship is unrelated to radicalism, but it reduces dissatisfaction with democracy (-0.09). The direct effect of subjective polarisation on dissatisfaction is positive but the effect mediated by partisanship is negative. Thus, it seems that partisanship seems to integrate people into the political system.

In the East (Figure 9.3), just like in the West, subjective polarisation increases radicalism (0.38) and civic disposition decreases dissatisfaction (-0.16), though these influences are somewhat weaker. As opposed to the West, however, there are no cross-influences: polarisation is not related to dissatisfaction and civic disposition is directly unrelated to

radicalism. The indirect effect of civic disposition on radicalism is small but positive: if informed and efficacious people develop partisan identification then they become more radical. Most importantly, partisanship appears to play a different role in the East than in the West. It is unrelated to satisfaction but it increases radicalism (0.07). Its role seems to be more adversarial than integrative.

Discussion and conclusions

The findings presented in this chapter suggest that partisanship does not depend a great deal on the social background of the individual. In so far as relationships exist, it is the more resourceful people and people with higher capacity for civic political participation (men, older, educated, married, higher income) who are more partisan. It seems that, contrary to the expectations of the cognitive mobilisation literature, we have not yet arrived at a post-modern era where the elite have cut their links with parties. Partisanship goes together with greater satisfaction with democracy and greater political efficacy as well.

All these expectations were based on the social and political integration hypotheses and these hypotheses received strong support. At the same time the polarized emotional and cognitive map of politics has proved to have an even larger impact on the intensity of partisan attachments. This finding is simultaneously trivial and paradoxical. It is trivial in the sense that partisanship and differential liking of political parties (our 'affective polarization' variable) to some extent presuppose each other. It is paradoxical because democracy is supposed to stabilise when the people are moderate and inclusive, when party competition is not seen as a life-or-death struggle but as a routine practice that evaluates the

incumbents and sets the course for new government policies. Citizens with this mindset should see most of the parties as potentially acceptable agents and support the best one according to their interests and values. But our data show that the perception of the struggle of parties as a fight between good and evil is conducive to stronger partisan attachments.

Although we did not have the best data for measuring the political context and institutions, the analysed variables explained more than half of the variance in country level partisanship. Older, polarized countries with fewer constraints on the parliamentary majority tend to have higher levels of partisanship. In systems with few parties the level of partisanship is slightly higher, either because citizens have less experience of shifting from one party to another or, in line with the rest of the findings, because such contexts allow for more concentrated and therefore more spectacular clashes between major party alternatives. These relations detected at the aggregate level point in the same direction as the individual level analysis: the most important factor behind partisanship, next to the established and internalized democratic practices, is adversarial politics.

East-West differences proved to be smaller than expected, obviously partly due to the fact that both regions are very heterogeneous. The general model of partisanship applies to post-communist Eastern Europe as well. The differences expected on social status, age, and education materialized only to a very limited extent. Age of the parties matters more in the West, while leftist orientation has a more positive impact in the East.

The most interesting difference between East and West is in the mediating role of partisanship. In the West partisanship turns subjective polarisation, a potentially destabilising factor, into satisfaction with democracy, a beneficial outcome. In the East, on the other hand, 'positive' factors, like efficacy and knowledge, seem to be translated by partisanship into a potentially 'negative' mindset, ideological radicalism. The normative implications of this process are open to debate, since strong ideological commitments are not necessarily problematic. But the inability of partisanship to function as an instrument of integration casts doubt on the assumed positive role of parties in consolidating democracy.

Conflict and polarisation can be supported by the psyche of the individuals and by the macro institutions of the polity. Our analysis indicates that both dimensions work, and they work in a similar direction, pointing to the role of adversarial politics as the principal foundation of strong partisanship. Institutions and individual perceptions are linked by party strategies. As shown elsewhere (Enyedi 2005), elite discourse that teaches citizens to see politics as a struggle between mutually exclusive camps can, if coupled with adequate organisational strategies, create strong political identities even in the twenty-first century. And since familial socialisation is losing importance across the whole of Europe we can expect that polarisation-based explanations will gain more relevance.

Table 9.1 The percentage of political party identifiers in different European countries

Western Europe	% identifiers	Eastern Europe	% identifiers
Ireland 2002	27.0	Belarus 2001	8.2
Netherlands 1998	27.8	Slovenia 1996	20.1
Belgium 2003	34.2	Lithuania 1997	30.6
Germany 1998	36.0	Hungary 1998	34.9
Switzerland 1999	36.5	Poland 2001	37.6
Germany 2002	36.5	Bulgaria 2001	42.5
Netherlands 2002	39.2	Romania 1996	44.4
Norway 2001	40.6	Czech Republic 1996	44.7
Spain 2000	41.4	Russia 2000	48.2
Switzerland 2003	41.5	Poland 1997	48.4
Spain 1996	42.2	Hungary 2002	51.1
Portugal 2005	43.6	CzechRepublic 2002	53.3
Britain 2005	44.9	Russia 1999	58.7
Finland 2003	45.7	Ukraine 1998	59.3
Britain 1997	45.7		
Sweden 1998	46.7		
Denmark 2001	46.7		
Portugal 2002	48.0		
Sweden 2002	48.2		

Denmark 1998	48.7
Iceland 1999	50.5
France 2002	52.2
Norway 1997	52.4
Iceland 2003	52.6
Spain 2004	59.0

Notes: Percentage calculated comparing the number of YES answers to B3028 against all other responses. Weighted by CSES sample weight (B1010_1).

Table 9.2 Correlation between partisanship and socio-economic status indicators

	Age	Education	Family Income	SES (B2012)		Urbanization	Religious service att.
East	0.11***	0.08*	0.05*	0.18 White-collar more partisan		0.02	-0.04
West	0.13***	0.08***	0.06***	0.12 workers and farmers more partisan		0.02	0.03

Note: Entries are Pearson correlation coefficients except in SES column, where they are contingency coefficients. The data are weighted for equal representation of each election study. Calculation incorporated the design effect (countries as clusters, calculated using Stata application *corr_svy*, by Nick Winter).

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05.

Table 9. 3 Political correlates of partisanship

	Satisf. with democracy	Political efficacy	Perceived party polariz.	L/R	Affective polariz.	Left-Right self-pl.	Ideological radicalism	Political info.
East	-0.03	0.23***	0.16***		0.38***	-0.01	0.29***	0.25***
West	-0.11***	0.24***	0.17***		0.34***	0.00	0.21***	0.16***

Note: Political efficacy constructed by averaging the summarized responses to B3013 and B3014 (in the common direction). Weighted for equal representation of each election study. Calculation incorporated the design effect (countries as clusters) (calculated using Stata application *corr_svy*, by Nick Winter).

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05.

Table 9.4 Socio-demographic predictors of partisanship

	East			West		
	b		Std. Error	b		Std. Error*
Age	0.25	***	0.039	0.27	***	0.030
Gender (Female)	-0.04	**	0.012	-0.04	***	0.007
Education	0.18	**	0.057	0.15	***	0.025
Religious services attendance	-0.04		0.027	0.02		0.042
Rural or urban residence	-0.03		0.032	0.02		0.017
Family status (Single)	-0.01		0.012	0.01		0.007
Family income	0.06	*	0.027	0.04	*	0.018
R squared	0.03			.04		

Note: Regression equation incorporates the design effect (countries as clusters); fitted for the two subgroups (Eastern and Western). Taylor linearized variance estimation. Variables are recoded to the range from 0 to 1.

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05.

Table 9.5 Attitudinal predictors of partisanship

	East			West		
	b		Std. Error	b		Std. Error
Ideological radicalism	0.11	***	0.020	0.14	***	0.016
Political efficacy[a]	0.20	***	0.010	0.21	***	0.014
Affective polarization	0.48	***	0.045	0.48	***	0.032
Perceived L/R party polarization	-0.11	*	0.046	0.08	*	0.039
Dissatisfaction with democratic process	-0.02		0.031	-0.10	***	0.018
Left-right self placement	-0.05		0.025	-0.03		0.020
Political information	0.15	***	0.039	0.12	***	0.021
R squared	0.19			0.16		

Notes: Regression equation incorporates the design effect (countries as clusters); fitted for the two subgroups (Eastern and Western). Taylor linearized variance estimation. Variables are recoded to the range from 0 to 1.

*** $p<.001$, ** $p<.01$, *$p<.05$.

[a] Average of reversed B3013 and B3014.

Table 9.6 Correlation between average partisanship and attitudes

Average affective polarization	Left-right	Ideological radicalism	Average (dis)satisfaction with democracy	Average efficacy	Average perception of polarization
0.37*	-0.18	0.19	-0.14	0.14	0.18

*p<.05.

Table 9.7 Correlation between average partisanship and institutional characteristics

Lack of constraints	Party System Polarization	Fragmentation (Rae)	Average age of party system
0.48**	0.38*	-0.20	0.33*

** p<.01, *p<.05.

Table 9.8 Macro-level model of partisanship including the region variable

Adjusted Rsq.=.60	b		Std. Error	Beta
Polarization of respondent's party L-R estimates	-0.32		0.404	-0.17
Affective polarization	0.82	*	0.367	0.42
Left-right	0.15		0.213	0.10
Ideological radicalism	0.15		0.088	0.32
Dissatisfaction with democracy	0.83		0.439	0.41
Political Efficacy	1.18	**	0.389	0.44
Party system polarization	0.26	***	0.072	0.58
Fractionalization (Rae)	-1.69		1.236	-0.20
No constraint for parties	0.10		0.183	0.10
Average age of party system	0.00		0.007	0.20
Region: Western Europe	1.03	**	0.368	0.72

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, *p<.05.

Figure 9.1 Partisanship and left-right self-identification in two regions

Figure 9.2 The mediating role of partisanship in Western Europe

Western Europe

Chi-square = 1521.360 (15 df)
p=.000
RMSEA=.049
Standardized estimates

Figure 9.3 The mediating role of partisanship in Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe

Chi-square = 1237.859 (17 df)
p=.000
RMSEA=.055
Standardized estimates

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[1] Converse (1969: 142) also treated strong partisanship as a precondition to democratic stability.

[2] Achen (2002) has argued that children may use their parents' behaviour to infer what is in their best interests. According to this interpretation the association between child and parents' party loyalties is quite rational.

[3] Norris (2005) found the religious to be also characterized by stronger partisanship, but this may be a function of the political mobilisation of religion in the particular country.

[4] These authors found this relationship weakening and among the youngest cohorts disappearing.

[5] Cf. Schmitt and Holmberg (1995). Polarisation has also been found to decrease volatility in Eastern Europe (Tavits 2005).

[6] Like Norris, we use CSES data, but we have more countries and use different indicators.

[7] Education was measured with an 8 value scale (1 = none, 2 = incomplete primary, 3 = primary completed, 4 = incomplete secondary, 5 = secondary completed, 6 = post-secondary trade/vocational school, 7 = university undergraduate degree incomplete, 8 = university undergraduate degree completed). For the Czech 2002 study, respondents with 'special code' 9, signifying graduate education, were coded 8. Family status was measured by a dummy variable 1 = single, 0 = not single (married, divorced, widow). Religiosity was measured by the question how often one attends religious service (1 = never, 2 = once a year, 3 = two to eleven times a year, 4 = once a month, 5 = two or more times a month, 6 = once a week).

[8] By including Belarus we already stretch the limits.

[9] The data-set was weighted in order to give equal weight to each election study sample.

[10] This method imposes a number of assumptions on the data. We have, however, also experimented with four and six value scales. The relationships we found tended to be somewhat weaker but made no difference to the substantive conclusions.

[11] Needless to say, these two features allow only a very rough assessment of the underlying phenomenon.

[12] The Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2003 (Klaus Armingeon, Philipp Leimgruber, Michelle Beyeler, Sarah Menegale, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne) and the Comparative Data Set for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989-2004 (Klaus Armingeon and Romana Careja, Institute of Political Science, University of Berne).

[13] Some other examples, like the Dutch (2002) one, with r = 0.22, are more supportive.

[14] Note that the East has more ideological radicalism (7.7 compared with 5.3), more affective polarization (3.1 compared with 2.6), more polarized perception of the party system (3.2 compared with. 2.7) and more dissatisfaction with democracy (2.6 compared with 2.2.) than the West. The regional differences on the other political variables are not significant (all the calculations take into account the complex sample design).

[15] Right wingers had stronger party identification in Denmark 2001, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Lithuania, Portugal 2002, and Romania, while the left was more identity-based in Switzerland 2003, Spain 1996, Russia and Sweden. The direction of the relationship changed from positive (1997) to negative (2001) in Poland.

[16] The correlation was particularly high in Bulgaria (0.30), Switzerland 2003 (0.29), Czech Republic 1996 (0.36), Iceland 1999 (0.30), Poland 1997 and 2001 (both 0.30), and Russia 2000 (0.35).

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[17] In earlier models type of electoral system (proportional representation or majoritarian) and the powers of the president were also examined but were unrelated to partisanship.

[18] RMSEA is the fit index root mean square error of approximation. Values below 0.08 indicate acceptable fit and below 0.05 indicate close fit (Kline 2005). The fit of the models could have been improved by including some additional covariance and path coefficients, but these would have lacked much substantive meaning. Covariances were calculated using the CSES data-set weighted for equal representation of each election study. All statistics presented here were estimated with the maximum likelihood method based on the covariance matrix.